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COMMENTS
The following comments were written by students at Northwestern University School of Law. Con-
tributors to the present issue are Philip E. Cutler, Carol R. Thigpen, Timothy R. Young, and Ed-
ward B. Mueller.
THE EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF SPECTROGRAPHIC
VOICE IDENTIFICATION
Ever since it was heralded in 19621 as a fool-
proof method of personal identification, voice
identification by spectrographic analysis, the
"voiceprint" technique,2 has been in a legal limbo.
Scientists could not agree whether the technique
possessed any validity at all, or agree on who was
competent to pass judgment on that threshold
question. Because a judicial determination of
the admissibility of scientific evidence and the
expert testimony necessary to interpret it is tra-
ditionally keyed to scientific acceptance of the
principle from which the testimony is derived, 4
I See Kersta, Voiceprint Identification Infallibility,
34 J. AcousricAL Soc' r AB 1978 (1962); Doing New
Tricks with Sound, Bus. WEEK, June 2, 1962, at 80;
N.Y. Times, May 24, 1962, at 37, col. 8. Lawrence G.
Kersta an electrical engineer, physicist, and a former
researc scientist with the Bell Telephone laboratories,
published his thesis that "vofceprints," like finger-
prints, could positively and reliably identify individuals
in a British scientific journal late in 1962. Kersta,
Voiceprint Identification, 196 NATURE 1253 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Kersta, NATR-E].
2 Although a number of proponents of this method of
voice identification refer to it by the popular handle
"voiceprint," that term conjures up an analogy to
fingerprint identification which is wholly inapposite.
Letter from Dr. Peter N. Ladefoged to Dr. Edward
David, Jr., Science Adviser to the President of the
United States, May 24, 1971; Bolt, el al., Speaker Iden-
tification by Speech Spectrograms: A Scientists' View of
Its Reliability for Legal Purposes, 47 J. Acousnicr.
Soc'y AM. 597, 599-600, 606-08 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Bolt, Reliability]. Such an analogy, while at-
tractive because of certain superficial similarities, at-
tributes to the technique a degree of precision which is
simply non-existent and which is almost certain to
mislead those untutored in the complex theories of
speech upon which spectrographic voice analysis de-
pends. Consequently, the technique will be referred to
throughout this comment as "spectrographic voice
analysis."
I Cedarbaums, Voiceprint Identification: A Scientic
and Legal Dilemma, 5 CRw. L. Bun:.. 323, 327-36
(1969); Kamine, The Voiceprint Technique: Its Structure
and Reliability, 6 SAx DIEGo L. REv. 213, 232-36
(1969). Cf. Comment, The Admissibility of Voiceprint
Evidence, 14 S.D.L. REv. 129 (1969).
4The admissibility of expert opinion testimony
derived from novel or scientific procedures and devices
is dealt with infra, text accompanying notes 50-69.
admissibility was withheld. Recent developments
in both science and the law, however, indicate
that despite initially adverse scientific and judicial
reaction, spectrographic voice identification is
perhaps coming of legal age. This comment will
assess the impact of these developments on the
technique's status as admissible evidence.5
Tim TECHiQUE
Speaker recognition by spectrographic voice
analysis is a seemingly simple, but fundamentally
complex, method of personal identification.' In
making an identification by this method,7 the
The constitutional ramifications of the technique
are excluded from the scope of this comment. They are,
however, quite real and as yet undefined. The Seventh
Circuit for example, has held that a grand jury may
not subpoena a number of witnesses, solely for the
purpose of obtaining voice exemplars (apparently for
spectrographic comparison), without complying with
fourth amendment "reasonableness" requirements.
In re Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. granted,
92 S.Ct. 2056 (1972). Serious questions of "reasonable-
ness" also arise in the method used to obtain the voice
exemplar. See, e.g., People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d
437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968); State ex rel. Trimble v.
Hedman, .. _Minn_, 192 NW.2d 432 (1971).
SCurrently, there are several methods of personal
identification which purport to have forensic value.
Fingerprints, sole prints, and palm prints are, of course,
the most widely recognized. See Inbau, Scientific Evi-
dence in Criminal Cases, 25 J. CRin. L. & C. 500 (1934).
Two rather novel methods of personal identification
have been suggested recently: Hirschi, Identification of
Earprints, 24 KsnarAnrsTrx 75 (1970); Suzuki &
Tsuchihashi, Personal Identification by Means of Lip
Prints, 17 J. FOR. MED. 52 (1970). It was suggested at
one time that electrocardiograms could provide a
reliable means of identification, though the author
recognized its limited forensic use. Castellanos, Per-
sonal Identification by Electrocardiography, 23 J. CRim.
L. & C. 356 (1932).
There are three known methods of speaker recog-
nition. The oldest method, of course, is identification by
ear. Another method is computer analysis of speech
spectrograms. The latter technique is identical to the
subjective comparative analysis of speech spectro-
grams under consideration here, except that a computer
is substituted for the human examiner. At present,
this method, although potentially more reliable because
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Lawrence Kersta, an electrical engineer and
physicist, has been the foremost advocate of the
validity of personal identification by spectro-
graphic voice analysis.' His claim that the tech-
nique is accurate and reliable is founded on two
propositions.
The theory of invariant speech13 is the corner-
stone of his hypothesis that individuals can be
identified by the spectral characteristics of their
voices. The theory posits that the characteristic
spectral patterns of phonetically identical utter-
ances vary more between two individuals (in-
terspeaker variability) than between two such
utterances spoken by the same individual (intra-
speaker variability). Although so far the theory
has not been proven directly,14 Kersta has but-
tressed the theory by applying his own hybrid
form of statistical probability' 5 to the acoustic
theory of speech production.'6 He argues that
since both the dimensions of the vocal cavities
and the coupling of the articulators, which define
the spectrum for a given sound, are affected by
heredity, sex, age, and socio-environmental fac-
tors, it is extremely unlikely that two individuals
would develop spectrographically identical speech
patterns.' While a superficially attractive ra-
tionale for voice uniqueness, a proper application
12See note 1 supra. Although Kersta attracted con-
siderable attention with his claims to "voiceprint"
infallibility, there is evidence that he was not the first
to advance this theory. See Tosi, et al., The Current
Status (1971) of Voice Identification, October 18, 1971
(unpublished paper presented at the 82d meeting of the
Acoustical Society of America). Kersta is now president
of Voiceprint Laboratories, Somerville, N.J. His com-
pany manufactures a sound spectrograph and offers
consulting services to law enforcement agencies.
"Although the individual spectral characteristics in
the speech signal do not remain invariant, the theory
presumes that speech habits, once formed, vary more
between two individuals pronouncing the same sound
than between two pronunciations of the same sound by
one individual. An excellent technical discussion of the
acoustic speech theory can be found in G. FANT, Acous-
Tic THEORY or SPEEcH PRODUCTION (1960) and P.
LADEFOGED, ETEENrS or AcoUsTic PHoNETics (1962).
See also Kamine, supra note 3, at 222-24.
"4 But cf. text accompanying notes 72-73 infra.
1For a discussion of probability theory, see generally
C. O'HARA & J. OSTERBURG, Amt INTRoDUcTIoN rO
CiuinqnsTics 655-96 (1949); J. WIomoRE, THE
SCrENCE OF JUDicmi PROOF § 154 (3d ed. 1937).
1 See note 13 supra.
7 Kersta, NATURE at 1254-55. See generally Kersta,
Speaker Recognition and Identification by Voiceprint,
40 CoNN. B.J. 586 (1966).
of probability theory demands substantially more
precision than this.'$
Kersta also asserts that a trained examiner, by
visually comparing a series of spectrograms for
objective points of similarity, can, because of the
speech pattern uniqueness reflected on the spec-
trogram, identify or eliminate one unknown
speaker from a group of many known speakers.19
Kersta's initial experiments 0 with spectro-
graphic voice analysis demonstrated that the
technique showed potential as a means of personal
identification, but did not present an identifica-
tion task. His experiments merely tested the ability
of a trained examining team to match spectrograms
with speakers in a dosed set of exemplars.n Using
speaker groups of up to twelve members,u error
18 The number of variables which enter into speech
production are not easily defined, either in quantitative
or qualitative terms. See HECKER, SPEAKER REcoG-
NmoN at 4-23, 70. In any event, the use of probability
theory in court to prove an assumption or conclusion
has been criticized by both courts and commentators.
See, e.g., People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33
(1968); State v. Sneed, 76 N.M. 349, 414 P.2d 858
(1966); Kingston, Probability and Legal Proceedings,
57 J. Cin. L.C. & P.S. 93 (1966); Tribe, Trial by
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process,
84 HAuv. L. RPv. 1329 (1971). Cf. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 448 n.2 (1971).
"9 It is important to note that while the identification
process relies for its foundation on scientific principles,
the technique itself is not a science but an art. See notes
88-89 and accompanying text infra; cf. People v. King,
266 Cal. App. 2d 437,451, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478,487 (1968).20 Kersta, NATua. See also Hennessy & Romig, A
Re'e v of the Experiments Involving Voiceprint Identifi-
cation, 16 J. FOR. SCI. 183, 190-91 (1971).
21 In a matching task the examiner is required only
to sort out the spectrograms which most resemble each
other, knowing that a match exists. The identification-
discrimination task relevant to a practical application of
spectrographic voice analysis involves a two step
procedure. The examiner must initially decide which, if
any, of the spectrograms before him is most similar to
that of the unknown voice. He then must decide posi-
tively that the two represent a single individual's
identical sounds. See generally HEcER, SPEAKER
REcoGNiTioN 66-68.
21 In Kersta's sorting trials, four exemplars of ten
cue-words for each speaker, spoken in isolation and in
context, were recorded and spectrographed. Two-
member examining teams were then randomly pre-
sented with four same-word spectrograms for each
speaker, and asked to sort them into speaker piles.
Speaker groups of five, nine, and twelve members were
used, but the examiners were aware at all times that an
equal number of spectrograms were available for
matching with each speaker. The cue words used were
the ten words occurring most frequently in American
speech: I, you, it, me, on, the, is, and, a, and to. See
Kersta, NATURE. Kersta apparently used spectrograms
of words spoken in isolation as a control, since the
spectral characteristics of a given speech sound are
defined in part by the sounds which immediately pre-
1972]
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rates in these trials ranged from 0.8% for words
spoken in isolation to 1.0% for words excerpted
from context.3 In subsequent experiments per-
formed under Kersta's direction, the number of
speakers represented by the set of spectrograms
presented to the examiners was increased, but
the matching format of the experiment was ad-
hered to. These experiments confirmed his initial
findings.24
From these extremely low error rates, Kersta
concluded that spectrograms of an individual's
speech patterns for particular words are as unique
in their identifying characteristics as fingerprints, 25
thus rendering the technique a reliable method of
personal identification when performed by a
trained examiner.28 In addition, Kersta claimed
that neither passage of time nor conscious efforts
at mimicry could frustrate a system of identifica-
tion based on spectrographic voice analysis.27 He
further maintained that the relatively higher
pitch of the female voice would not affect the
accuracy of such an identification technique.21
Other experimenters, all reputable scientists
in speech, phonetics, or associated fields, were
unable to duplicate Kersta's high accuracy rates,
even for matching-to-sample tests.2 9 It appears
cede and follow the sound, excerpted. See HECKER,
SPEAKER REcOGNInON at 12-13.
2 Kersta, NATURE at 1256, 1257.2 Hennessy & Romig, supra note 20, at 190-91.
See generally HECKER, SPEAKER RECOGNiTioN at 56-73.
25 But see authorities cited in note 2 supra.
26 Neither of these extrapolative conclusions can be
drawn from either the format or composition of Kersta's
experiments. Because of this, Kersta's experiments are
of no value for validating the technique generally.
r No experimental data has ever been produced to
substantiate these claims, and they remain conclusory
at best. Compare Kersta, Speaker Recognition and
Identification by Voiceprint, supra note 17; Kersta,
NATLRE; Kersta, Voiceprint Identification and Appli-
cation, 51 FINGER PRINT & IDENT. 3 (May, 1970);
with HEcKER, SPAKER REcOGNITiON at 69-70;
Ladefoged & Vanderslice, The "Voiceprint" Mystique,
in WORKING PAPERS IN PstONETlCS-7 140 (1967) [here-
inafter cited as Ladefoged, Mystique]. See generally
wNEwswEEK, Jan. 24, 1972, at 13; Wall Street Journal,
Jan. 11, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
2 Ladefoged, Mystique at 140, disputes this claim.
However, spectrograms have been used to successfully
convict one female defendant, United States v. Phoenix,
No. 70-CR-428 (S.D. Ind. April 15, 1971) (telephoned
bomb hoax), and to authorize an arrest warrant for
another, State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, -Minn-,
192 N.W.2d 432 (1971) (murder). No experimental
evidence regarding the identifiability of the female
voice by spectrographic analysis has yet been reported.
21 Hennessy & Romig, supra note 20, at 192-97.
Indeed, one group of experimenters discovered that the
accuracy rates for aural speaker recognition far ex-
ceeded those achieved for identification by visual
analysis of speech spectrograms. Stevens, Carbonell
that most of the difficulty other experimenters
experienced can be traced to Kersta's failure to
publish detailed technical reports of his experi-
ments and the objective identification factors
used by his examiners. Kersta's secrecy, coupled
with his defensive attitude toward the technique
and the extrapolations he drew from his limited
experiments, created an atmosphere of distrust
for the entire technique which may have obscured
the real issues involved in gaining scientific ac-
ceptance for the technique. However, a study
completed in 1970 under the direction of Oscar
Tosi at Michigan State University"0 not only rep-
licated Kersta's original experiments and con-
firmed his high accuracy rates for matching-to-
sample tests' but also tested the accuracy and
reliability of spectrographic voice identification
in experiments having a true identification format.
THE TOSI STUDY: PORMAT AND RESULTS
Since in the matching-to-sample tests conducted
by Kersta and others a match for the "unknown"
spectrogram always existed, the trial became
merely a process of elimination. This type of trial
has no relation to a forensic application of the
technique and the results obtained through such
trials cannot be extrapolated to validate the tech-
nique as a means of identification. The format
of the Tosi study, however, was designed to test
varying conditions 3 which could be expected to
& Woods, Speaker Authentication and Identification, 44
J. AcousTcac Soc'Y Am. 1596 (1968). Hennessy &
Romig, supra, however, conclude that while the results
of these attempted replications are in sharp contrast
with Kersta's near-perfect identification scores, and
thus do raise questions as to the validity of the tech-
nique, the lack of training given the examiners, the lack
of uniformity in the objective points of similarity
which the examiners were instructed to look for, and
the use of a different spectrograph all may have seriously
impaired the validity of the test results.
10 The Tosi study was conducted under a grant from
the United States Department of justice, Law En-
forcement Assistance Administration, to the Michigan
State Police. The results are summarized and explained
in Tosi, et al., An Experiment on Voice Identification:
Excerpts from the Report SHSLR 171 (Michigan
State University, July 1971) [hereinafter cited as Tosi,
Experiment]. See also Michigan Department of State
Police, Voice Identification Research: A Summary of
the Report to the U.S. Dept. of Justice Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration (Grant No. NI 70-004,
Feb. 1971).
31 Since a matching-to-sample test utilizes only closed
sets, supra note 21, only one type of error existed:
false identification. Error rates averaged 1%, sub-
stantially the same as those experienced by Kersta.
Tosi, Experiment at 19.3 2 Hecker sets forth the major variables inherent in
speaker recognition by subjective analysis of speech
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have a major impact on the reliability of the tech-
nique in a forensic setting.
First, both open and dosed trials" were con-
ducted and examiner-awareness of the nature of
the trial was recorded. Because the examiner
would never know whether the author of the "un-
known" spectrogram was also included in the
"known" speaker population in an objective fo-
rensic application, the importance of this variable
to the technique is obvious.
Second, the effect of a reduction in cue material
on identification accuracy rates was tested by
presenting the examiners with nine cue-word spec-
trograms" for each speaker in the first phase of
the study, but permitting only six cue-word spec-
trograms for each speaker in the second phase."
A third very important feature of the Tosi study
was its use of both contemporary and non-con-
temporary matching spectrograms in testing
speaker identification. 6 Since speech spectrography
has shown that the same person rarely utters the
same sound in exactly the same way,' 7 this feature
of the study attempted to determine the effect
of time-lapse" on the ability of the examiners to
make positive identification or elimination.
spectrograms. HECKER, SPEAiER R1coG TIoN at
56-65. See also Bolt, Reliability.
"In an open trial, the speaker population against
which the unknown spectrogram must be compared
may or may not contain the author of the known spec-
trogram. In a closed trial, on the other hand, a matching
spectrogram is always contained in the speaker popula-
tion.
" The cue-words used were: it, is, on, you, and, the,
I, to, and me. A sufficient number of different sounds
must be given to the examiner to enable him to judge
the spectral patterns of the individual to be identified.
35 Overall results of the second phase did not differ
significantly from those experienced in the first. Tosi,
Experiment at 17-18. However, Tosi noted that in-
creasing examiner proficiency very likely contributed
to this result.
s6 In certain of the trials, the match for the unknown
speaker's spectrogram represented a spectrogram made
from an exemplar recorded contemporaneously with
that representing the "unknown". In other trials the
match was a non-contemporary spectrogram, i.e., the
exemplar from which the matching spectrogram was
made was recorded by the same person but at a later
time.
V This aspect of speech is known as intraspeaker
variability. The sources of intraspeaker variability are
not well known, but experimental evidence suggests
that aging, disease, and psychological stress may affect
a person's speech production and consequently the
spectral characteristics of his speech patterns. HxcxxR,
SPEAxER REcoGNImTo at 16-18, 69-70. See also notes
91-92 infra. An obvious contributor to intraspeaker
variability is the environmental factor which shapes
the articulation of speech. See note 11 supra.
"Only non-contemporary matching spectrograms
are used in a forensic application of the technique.
A fourth variable tested was the effect of the
context of the cue material and its mode of re-
cording on the reliability of the technique. The
cue-words from which both the "known" and
"unknown" spectrographs were made were spoken
first in isolation, then in a fixed context, and finally
in a random context."9 In addition, the cue-words
were recorded in three different ways: in a quiet
environment directly into a tape recorder, over
a telephone line in a quiet environment, and over
a telephone line in a noisy environment.40
In selecting a speaker population of two hun-
dred fifty males, drawn from a population of
twenty-five thousand at the university, Tosi at-
tempted to meet one of the requirements for valida-
tion of the technique: homogeneity of the speaker
group.a The speakers selected had no speech de-
The time-lapse between obtaining the contemporary
spectrogram used as the "unknown" and the non-
contemporary matching spectrogram used as the
"known" (the match) was one month. Tosi, Experi-
ment at 7, 8.
39 The "fixed context" refers to identical sentences
from which the desired sound is excerpted. The "random
context" refers to different sentences from which an
identical sound is excerpted. The fixed context would
thus test identification accuracy where an accused reads
from a transcript of an unknown speaker's conver-
sation; the random context trial would test accuracy in
those situations where a voice exemplar of the exact
words of the transcribed sample could not be obtained.
Compare State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384
(1967); State v. McKenna, 94 N.J. Super. 71, -226
A.2d 757 (Essex County Ct. 1967); with People v.
King, 226 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968);
State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, ._inn.., 192
N.W.2d 432 (1971).
Frequency and noise distortion can impair the
reliability of spectrographic speaker recognition. Since
forensic applications would involve varied environ-
ments, it was important to measure the effect of fre-
quency and noise distortion on the technique's reliabil-
ity. HECKER, SPEAxER REcOGNiTioN at 61-62. In
the Tosi study, fifty decibels of white noise, measured
at the head of the speaker, was used for distortion
purposes. Tosi, Experiment at 6.
The greatest applicability of spectrographic voice
identification in the criminal area is to crimes in which
the telephone is used. See, e.g., In re Dionisio, 442
F.2d 276 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 92 S.Ct. 2056 (1972)
(interstate transmission of gambling information);
United States v. Phoneix, No. 70-CR-428 (S.D. Ind.
April 15, 1971) (bomb threat); United States v. Wright,
17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967) (obscene
telephone call); State v. Alea, No. 70-9397 (Dade
County, Fla., Crim. Ct. Sept. 18, 1971) appeal docketed,
No. 71-1419, Fla. App., Dec. 21, 1971 (extortion); State
ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, __Minn__, 192 N.W.2d
432 (1971) (enticement of police officer into ambush).
" HEcxEpR, SPEAuER RECOGNIvION at 57. See also
Bolt, Reliability at 601-02, 610-12. Homogeneity of
the speaker population is an important factor in deter-
mining the validity of any method of speaker identifi-
cation because interspeaker variability in speech can be
expected to be lowest among members of ethnic, racial,
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fects and utilized a standard American English
dialect.4
Each of the twenty-nine examiners used in the
experiment was given one month of training in
basic acoustic speech principles and in the inter-
pretation of speech spectrograms. Moreover, the
examiners were given several objective points of
similarity to look for when making comparisons
between spectrqgrams. 4" This training was far
more extensive than that given examiners in pre-
vious speaker recognition experiments utilizing
spectrograms."
In each of the nearly thirty-five thousand ran-
dom trials, 45 aural comparison of the speech sam-
ples was prohibited. The examiner was forced to
come to a positive conclusion, either rejecting or
accepting one of the "known" spectrograms as
identical with the "unknown", and an average
time of only fifteen minutes was devoted to study
of the spectrograms before a conclusion was de-
manded. These inhibiting factors, while necessary
as a control in the experiment, would not be pres-
ent in a forensic application of the technique.
46
regional, dialectic or similar groups, while intraspeaker
variability does not vary appreciably between ho-
mogeneous groups. HECKER, SPEAKER RECOGNITION
at 16. The speakers in the Tosi study were selected
because they exhibited no special regional accent or
other identifying characteristic. However, "homo-
geneity" of this speaker group was achieved on the
basis of aurally perceptual similarity in speech patterns,
whereas the crucial variable in spectrographic speaker
recognition is the similarity in appearance of spectro-
grams. Unfortunately, very little is known of the per-
ceptual and physical correlates of this type of speaker
homogeneity. Id. at 57. The impact of this variable on
the Tosi study as a general validation of the technique
is discussed infra, notes 74-87 and accompanying text.42 Tosi, Experiment at 8.
11 Although Kersta has never published a report
detailing exactly which characteristics he uses to deter-
mine speaker identity, Tosi became familiar with
Kersta's methods while attending a course at Kersta's
Voiceprint Laboratories. Tosi instructed his examiners
to consider the following objective points of similarity:
similar mean frequencies of vowel formants, formants'
bandwidths, gaps and types of vertical striations,
slopes of formants, durations, and characteristic pat-
terns of fricatives and interformants' energeries. These
factors were selected because they tend to be speaker-
dependent (interspeaker variability), rather than a
function of an individual's own variation in speech
patterns (intraspeaker variability). Tosi, Experiment
at 9. See generally G. FANT, supra note 13, at 20; Kamine,
supra note 3, at 216.
4See Hennessy & Romig, supra note 20, at 187-97.
45 The number of "known" speakers in each trial
varied from ten to forty.
46 In a forensic application of spectrographic voice
identification the examiner would make an initial
comparison by ear to select the speech sounds for
spectrographic comparison. In addition, he would be
permitted to take as much time as necessary to reach a
The statistical results of the open set trials,
which tested the reliability of the technique in
various forensic applications, indicate that overall
accuracy levels of 82-85% are possible under the
conditions tested.47 Although these figures indicate
an error range of 15-18%, this gross error rate
includes two types of error: false elimination (a
match was present but the examiner failed to
perceive it) and false identification (a match was
not present but the examiner mistakenly thought
there was one, or a match was present but the
examiner chose the wrong one). Only the latter
error, false identification, is particularly trouble-
some from a legal standpoint.3 Moreover, a break-
down of the gross error rate to reflect the differ-
entiation between types of error reveals, that the
risk of false identification is only 5-6% while that
of false elimination is 10-12%.49
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SPECTROGRAPEHIC
VOICE IDENTIFICATION EVIDENcE
Prior to publication of the results of the Tosi
study two of the three appellate courts which
considered the admissibility of a spectrographic
voice identification had held such evidence inad-
missible. 50 In both State v. Cary5 and People v.
conclusion. Furthermore, he would have three, not two,
general decision options: identical spectrograms in-
dicating identity of speakers, non-identical, and in-
sufficient information to reach a conclusion. Tosi,
Experiment at 21-22.
4id. at 19-20.
4$However, the existence of either type of error
demonstrates the degree to which intraspeaker and
interspeaker variability interact to confuse the ex-
aminer. This, of course, highlights the examiner-de-
pendent nature of the accuracy of spectrographic
voice identification.49Tosi, Experiment at 20. Although the decision
of elimination or identification in each trial was arrived
at jointly by an examining panel, Tosi had each member
rate his degree of confidence in the decision on a scale of
one to four. In examining the relationship of this con-
fidence-rating to errors, Tosi found that the less confi-
dent the examiner, the more likely that his decision
was in error. Tosi calculated that had his examiners
been permitted to express no opinion in those cases
where they were uncertain as to the correctness of their
decision, the gross error rate would fall to 7%. Of this,
2% would be attributable to false identification; 5%
to false elimination. Id.
50 h first forensic use of spectrographic voice
analysis apparently took place in a New York perjury
prosecution. People v. Straehie, Grim. No. 9323/64
(Westchester Co., N.Y., Sup. Ct., 1966). See Note,
Voiceprint Metlod of Identification-Reuctance of the
Courts Toward Acceptance of Scientific Evidence, 12
N.Y.L.F. 501 (1966). The €admissibility question,
however, never reached the appellate level because the
jury, unableto determine the weight to be accorded
such evidence, failed to reach a verdict. The perjury
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King12 the principal objection expressed to the
admission of such evidence was that experimenta-
tion had not yet progressed to the point where
the technique's reliability could be sufficiently
demonstrated. Shortly before the King decision,
however, a divided United States Court of Mili-
tary Appeals in United States v. Wright5 3 ruled
expert testimony regarding a spectrographic voice
identification admissible, relying solely on Kersta's
testimony as to the technique's reliability.
E FRYE RULE
As with all other types of evidence, relevanceA
is the principal determinant in the admissibility
of scientific evidence.55 The relevance of proffered
testimonial or tangible evidence is determined by
a judicial consideration of both the materiality
and probativeness of that which is offered.58 In
applying these evidentiary rules to scientific evi-
dence, including the expert testimony necessary
to interpret it, courts have usually relied on scien-
tific experts to initially approve the worth and
validity of a technique, thereby assuring the court
indictment was subsequently dismissed. 53 Misc. 2d
512, 279 N.Y.S.2d 115 (Westchester Co. Ct. 1967).
5t 99 N.J. Super 323, 332-34, 239 A.2d 680, 684-85
(1968), affd per curiam, 56 N.J. 16,266 A.2d 209 (1970).
The state supreme court initially 'considered the case
on an interlocutory appeal taken from a pretrial order
requiring Cary to submit a voice exemplar for spec-
trographic analysis. The supreme court remanded the
case for a determination of the admissibility question,
stating that the order was constitutionally permitted by
the fourth amendment only if the seized evidence,
Cary's voice, had the capacity to be admitted at trial.
State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 351, 230 A.2d 384, 388
(1967).
62266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 460-61, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478,
492-93 (1968).
17 U.S.C.M.A. 183,37 C.M.R. 447 (1967). Kersta's
opinion evidence was admitted on the theory that
unanimity among experts was not a prerequisite for
admissibility. Id. at 189, 37 C.M.R. at 453. Judge
Ferguson in his dissent noted that no evidence as to
scientific acceptance of the technique had been pre-
sented by the prosecution. Id. at 193, 37 C.M.R. at 457.
U See generally C. McCos.ncx, EVIDEN cE § 152
(1954) [hereinafter cited as McCoasncx]; 1 J.
WIGmoRE, EviDENcE §§ 12,28 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter
cited as WIGAoR].
55 Scientific evidence is a loose term applied to that
evidence from which a forensic scientist's or other
expert witness' testimony is deduced. Scientific evi-
dence itself is admitted into evidence only in the sense
that, e.g., a photographic enlargement showing finger-
print similarities is admitted.
56 Materiality and probativeness together constitute
relevance as that term is used to determine admissibility.
Materiality is determined by the issues before the
court. The tendency of a particular item of evidence
to prove a material fact is referred to as probativeness.
McComncK §§ 151, 152.
that the proffered evidence possesses at least a
minimum probative value. The general rule was
first set forth by the District of Columbia Circuit
in Frye v. United States," where the court stated:
[W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting ex-
pert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.68
The "general acceptance" test imposed by Frye
has troubled many commentators in the years
since its inception. 9 The major argument against
Frye is that a too literal application of the rule
would unjustifiably tend to restrict the acceptance
of new scientific techniques as admissible evidence.
However, while Frye remains the foundation upon
which courts base admissibility determinations
in the field of scientific evidence, several modem
courts have interpreted Frye's mandate in a de-
cidedly progressive vein, attending to the spirit
and policy of Frye rather than to the letter of its
rule.60
In attempting to refine somewhat the "general
acceptance" rule of Frye, a California appellate
court in People v, Williams,6 stated:
57 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). At issue was the
admissibility of the results of a polygraph examination.
The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Jennings, 252
Ill. 534, 96 N.E. 1077 (1911), had imposed a similar
test when ruling for the first time on the admissibility
of fingerprint identification evidence.
s 293 F. at 1013-24 (emphasis added). With regard
to expert testimony based on scientific evidence,
Wigmore stated his own version of the Frye rule:
When the testimony thus appearing to the ordinary.
layman to lack a rational basis is founded on ob-
servations made with esoteric methods or appa-
ratus ... the method should be explained by the
witness, and if it be vouched for in his branch of
learning, it suffices to admit his testimony.
2 WIGmotRE § 659.
5 See, e.g., McCoamcK § 170; J. RicHA Dsox,
MoDERN ScraNTiric EvinENcE § 6.18 (1961); Note,
supra note 50. McCormick feels that a "general ac-
ceptance" test is appropriate only for a court's taking
judicial notice of scientific facts. He would not impose
such a test for determining admissibility. McConmcx§ 170.
60 See, e.g., People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d
858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958); Coppolino v. State, 223
So.2d 68 (Fla. App. 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So.2d
120 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970). Both
cases are discussed infra in the text accompanying
notes 61-68.
61164 Cal. App. 2d 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958). The
court was ruling on the admissibility of the results of
a Nalline test for narcotics addiction. See generally
Grupp, The Nalline Test (Pts. 1-3), 61 J. C~asa. L.C. &
P.S. 296, 463, 62 J. Cums. L.C. & P.S. 286 (1970-71.)
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[T]he results of tests of the type here under attack,
as well as opinions based thereon, are admissible
only if the tests have gained acceptance in the field
of learning in which they are in use."
Although noting that the expert witnesses had
all acknowledged that it could not "truthfully
be said that the medical profession as a whole"
had generally accepted the test in question," the
court concluded that:
All of the medical testimony points to the reliabil-
ity of the test. It has been generally accepted by
those who would be expected to be familiar with its
use. In this age of specialization more should not be
required."
A further refinement of Frye was undertaken
by the court in Coppolino v. State." The admissi-
bility of expert testimony relating to a novel and
specially designed medical test for the presence of
a certain highly toxic poison in the deceased was
at issue. The court noted that prior to the dis-
covery and use of the test by the state's expert,
medical scientists believed it impossible to detect
either the presence of the toxin or its component
parts in the body."6 However, in upholding the
trial judge's ruling admitting the testimony of
experts who testified to the abnormally high pres-
ence of succinic add, a component of the toxin,
the court noted the Frye principle" and then
stated:
The problem presented to the trial judge was, were
the scientific tests performed by Umberger so un-
reliable and scientifically unacceptable that their
admission into evidence was error."
Coppolino thus appears to hold that if the of-
fered evidence or testimony is based on a test
62164 Cal. App. 2d at 860, 331 P.2d at 253 (emphasis
added).
6Id. at 862, 331 P.2d at 253. The defense presented
no witnesses to contradict the opinion evidence of the
state's experts that Nalline tests were considered
reliable and accurate by the medical profession gen-
erally. However, it was brought out on cross-examina-
tion that use of Nalline and familiarity with the process
was limited to "those in a specialized field who deal
with the narcotic problem." Id., 331 P.2d at 253-54.
64Id. at 862, 331 P.2d at 254 (emphasis added).
61223 So.2d 68 (Fla. App. 1968), appeal dismissed,
234 So.2d 120 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
66 Id. at 70.
6The court quoted from 2 B. JoNxs, EviDENcE §
457 (5th ed. 1958); which embodies the Frye rule. The
court noted that Florida apparently had adopted the
rule, quoting Kaminski v. State, 63 So.2d 339 (Fla.
1953), where that court quoted Frye. 223 So.2d at 70.
6223 So.2d at 70 (emphasis added).
or technique which is analytically and scientif-
ically valid, then notwithstanding the relative
newness of the test or technique and lack of ex-
posure to the profession, evidence derived from
it may be admitted. However, the implicit premise
of Frye, Williams, and Coppolino is that judicial
and scientific acceptance of a novel technique is
also dependent on the capacity of the test or ex-
periment to produce the offered results or extrap-
olations. 9
THE TOSI STUDY AS A VALIDATION
OF THE TECHNIQU
"Scientific Acceptance"
Completion of the Tosi study and publication
of the results removed a major scientific objection
to the forensic use of spectrographic voice identi-
fication: the total lack of large-scale experiments
investigating the technique's reliability in circum-
stances similar to those found in court cases o
In addition, the methodology employed by Tosi
gave a certain statistically replicable character
to his results~x But the admissibility requirements
of Frye, Williams, and Coppolino go beyond mere
statistical replicability. For the Tosi study to
have any positive effect on the legal status of
spectrographic voice identification, the results of
the study must be of a kind which permit scientific
extrapolation to validate the technique as a general
method of personal identification. It is Tosi's
contention that the results achieved by using his
relatively homogeneous speaker population can
be extrapolated to so validate the technique.
Recognizing that the present state of scientific
knowledge was inadequate to prove directly the
theory of invariant speech upon which the validity
of spectrographic voice identification depends, Tosi
felt nevertheless that such proof could be otbained
inferentially from a proper evaluation of empirical
data derived from a well constructed speaker
identification experiment. 2 However, the validity
11 See State v. Andretta, Crim. Indict. Nos. 445-66/
446-66 (Middlesex County, N.J., Ct., Law Div., May
4, 1972) (slip op. 7-8), discussed infra in the text ac-
companying notes 83-87, 114-16.
70Ladefoged has expressed the opinion that the
Tosi study was a model piece of scientific methodology,
"well designed and carried out with true scientific
objectivity." Letter, supra note 2. See authorities
cited in note 32 supra.71 See testimony of Peter Denes in State v. Andretta,
Crim Indict, Nos. 445-66/446-66 (Middlesex County,
N.J., Ct., Law Div., May 4, 1972) (slip op. at 12-14);
cf. letter, supra note 2.
2 Tosi, Experiment at 2. Hecker noted in his survey
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of such an evaluation, and consequently the ad-
missibility of evidence derived from use of the
technique, is itself dependent upon the sampling
and testing format of the experiment Further-
more, Tosi's conclusion that the validity and
reliability of spectrographic voice identification
has been proven by empirical data obtained in
his experiment is grounded solely on an assumption
that the inter- and intraspeaker variations within
a group of criminal suspects or within any other
speaker group would not differ substantially from
those which existed within his test group.74
In discussing the error rates reported by Tosi,
Peter Ladefoged, formerly a vehement critic of
spectrographic voice identification, 75 noted that
errors were often the result of examiner confusion
between certain pairs of voices. Conceding that
if Tosi's speaker population represented a statis-
tically valid sample of criminal suspects the rela-
tively low error rate of 6% false identification
could be taken as a probable maximum, Ladefoged
felt nonetheless that the "confusability" factor
should be further examined before fully accepting
all of Tosi's claims.7 6
Ladefoged's hesitancy in accepting the 6% rate
for false identification as a maximum2' stems from
his assessment of the homogeneity of the speaker
population used in the experiment. Although Tosi
was careful to achieve homogeneity in the general
sound of speech patterns,8 the college males con-
stituting the universal population, and conse-
quently those in the sample itself, almost certainly
prior to the Tosi study that the theory of invariant
speech, which appeared to underlie many of the spec-
trographic voice identification experiments, had not
been translated into a hypothesis which could be tested
with a finite population. HEcKxE, SPEAKER RECOG-
NNON at 70.
The court in King pointed out that '[n]ecessarily,
the court must analyze the sampling techniques used
[and] methods of verification. .. ." 266 Cal. App. 2d
at 457, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 491. See also Coppolino v.
State, 223 So.2d 68 (Fla. App. 1968).7 4Tosi, Experiment at 21. See note 41 supra.
7" See Ladefoged, Mystique.
76 Letter, supra note 2. Ladefoged and Vanderslice
note in their critique of Kersta's methods and technique
that they have found two randomly chosen persons
who exhibit remarkably similar spectrographic speech
patterns. Ladefoged, Mystique at 131-33.
77Tosi hypothesizes that if a trained examiner is
permitted as much time as necessary, is given sufficient
cue material, listens to both the known and unknown
voice exemplars, and is permitted to rate his confidence
in the identification opinion he gives, the accuracy of
identification by spectrographic voice analysis will
approach 100%. Tosi, Experiment at 20. See note 49
supra.
78 See note 41 supra.
came from different backgrounds. Because inter-
speaker variations in spectrographic speech pat-
terns can be expected to be greater the more het-
erogeneous the speaker population, 7 thus result-
ing in fewer confusable voices, it is debatable
whether a substantially similar number of voices
exist in a smaller, more homogeneous community
where interspeaker variations are fewer. Although
it may be reasonable, as Tosi claims,80 to assume
that the variation in probabilities will not be sta-
tistically significant, that claim remains for the
moment a mere hypothesis, unsupported by em-
pirical data. It is at least questionable whether
the criteria for admissibility are met by the results
and extrapolations of this one study.,,
This view, that the Tosi study, although meth-
odologically sound, simply did not go far enough
was advanced by Ladefoged in testimony during
the trial court's hearing on the defendant's habeas
corpus petition in State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedianp
and by two former associates of Kersta at Bell
Telephone Laboratories in State v. Andreta.P Al-
though Ladefoged has now apparently changed
his mind as to the degree to which the Tosi study
validated spectrographic voice identification,"
Peter Denes, one of the witnesses testifying in
the Andretta case and the co-author of a 1970
report" setting forth the requirements for scien-
tific validation of the technique, felt that the Tosi
study "only goes a small way towards clearing
up a very large area of uncertainty before some-
thing more definite could be said about the re-
liability of this method." 8 Denes did not feel
that the results of the Tosi study would change
7" HECKER, SPEAKER REcOGNITION at 16.80 Tosi, Experiment at 21.S It should be pointed out that there is a fundamental
difference between the test at issue in Coppolino and
Tosi's experimentation with spectrographic voice
identification. In Coppolino the test involved a chemical
reaction, the interrelationship of discernible physical
properties. Tosi's study, however, involved not a
constant, but rather a host of variables. While the
results of similar Coppolino-type tests can be predicted
with certainty once the proper formulas are deduced,
the results of Tosi's study are contingent upon variables
which are serially dependent on both other variables
and assumptions for their validity.
__1..Mnn_, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971) discussed
infra in the text accompanying notes 98-10.
3 Crim. Indict. Nos. 445-66/446-66 (Middlesex
County, N.J., Ct., Law Div., May 4, 1972), also dis-
cussed infra in the text accompanying notes 114-16.
" See testimony of Ladefoged in United States v.
Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972).85 See Bolt, Reliability.
86 State v. Andretta, Crim. Indict. Nos. 445-66/
446-66 (Middlesex County, N.J., Ct., Law Div., May
4, 1972) (slip op. at 12).
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in any way the negative conclusion as to the tech-
nique's scientific validity reached in the 1970
report."
The "confusabiity" factor to which Ladefoged
refers in his discussion of the Tosi study points
up the wholly examiner-dependent nature of the
reliability of spectrographic voice identification.
The ultimate identity inference to which the expert
testifies in court is derived not from scientific
principles, but rather from a purely subjective
comparative analysis of similarities in the sound
pattern parameters exhibited on a pair or series
of spectrograms. At the moment not even these
similarities can be quantitatively described.89 As
both Tosi and Ladefoged note,"° the ethics and
training of the examiner are highly important.
The examiner must be aware of and able to evalu-
ate the relationships between spectrum variations
on the spectrogram and speaker-dependent iden-
tity traits.
A further difficulty in accepting Tosi's extrap-
olations, apart from the fact that his experiment
did not adequately test the confusability of voices
or the degree to which inter- and intraspeaker
variability overlap among homogeneous popula-
tion groups, is that so little is understood about
speaker variabilities. Speech is a studied process
of imitation and one's speech habits are not only
subject to significant change prior to mature de-
velopment, but the effect of subsequent physio-
logical and environmental changes on the speech
pattern has not yet been determined.9' Moreover,
1
T Id. at 14.
I This characteristic highlights the technique's
similarity to polygraph testing. Although error rates
of less than 10% have been reported for the polygraph,
see F. INBAu & 3. RzEm, TRUTH & DECEPTION 226-34
(1966); Horvath & Reid, The Reliability of Polygraph
Examiner Diagnosis of Truth & Deception, 62 J. Crim.
L.C. & P.S. 276 (1971), neither courts nor scientists
have responded favorably to this technique. Also, the
nearly 50% rate of inconclusiveness experienced in
many spectrographic voice analyses, see Michigan
State Police, supra note 30 at 38-39, parallels the use-
fulness of the now debunked dermal nitrate test for
gunpowder. See Turkel & Lipman, Unreliability of
Dermal Nitrate Test for Gunpowder, 46 3. Cnx. L.C. &
P.S. 281 (1955).
11 See testimony of Denes, in State v. Andretta, supra
note 86, at 13-14. See generally Bolt, Reliability.
90 Tosi, Experiment at 21-22. See also letter, supra
note 2.
91 Mysak, Pitch and Duration Characteristics of Older
Males, 2 J. SPEEcH HEAnI G REs. 46 (1959), found that
aging is often accompanied by a rise in median fun-
damental frequency, greater variability in fundamental
frequency, and a slight reduction in speaking rate.
Sander, Maloney & Jackson, .Phonatory and Related
Changes with Advanced Age, 9 J. SPEEcH HEARNG REs.
353 (1966), speculated that the reduced range of fun-
due to inherent intraspeaker variability, the causes
of which have yet to be determined, no two spec-
trograms of phonetically identical utterances made
by the same speaker are ever exactly alike. Nor
is it fully understood yet what effect psychological
stress, quite possibly a frequent factor in criminal
acts, has on speech production. Two studies have
indicated, for example, that spectrograms made
of speech generated under stress conditions exhibit
significant change from those generated under
"normal" conditions."
Notwithstanding these reservations about the
validity of spectrographic voice identification, the
scientific reaction to Tosi's study and extrapola-
tions is in marked contrast to the feelings expressed
several years ago when Kersta published his
theories. Ladefoged, for example, has testified
in court that the dominant view of the scientific
community is presently in accord with an opinion
he expressed in a letter to Dr. Edward David,
Science Adviser to the President of the United
damental frequency which they found associated with
aging is caused by the dging of the laryngeal cartilages
and muscles.
Various diseases of the chest, larynx and central
nervous system are known to affect particular facets of
speech production, but their effect on the spectral
characteristics portrayed on the spectrogram is not
known. See HECKER, SPEAKER REcOGNmON at 18.
See also Kersta, Environmental Influence on the
Speech of Family Members Shown by Spectrographic
Speech Matching, 38 J. AcousTicAL Soc'Y Am. 935
(1965).
12 See Hecker, Stevens, von Bismark & Williams,
Manifestations of Task-Induced Stress in the Acoustic
Speech Signal, 44 J. AcousTIcAl Soc'Y Am. 993 (1968);
Williams & Stevens, On Determining the Emotional
State of Pilots During Flight: An Exploratory Study, 40
AEROSPACE AED. 1369 (1969). Stevens has suggested
that because forensic applications of spectrographic
voice identification may often be made in situations
where a speaker is undergoing stress, further research
into the physiological and emotional correlates of the
acoustic speech signal may be essential to determine
the validity of the technique. Interview with Dr.
Kenneth N. Stevens, Professor of Electrical Engi-
neering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in
Cambridge, Mass., Nov. 23, 1971.
9 The Technical Committee on Speech Communi-
cation of the Acoustical Society of America expressed
alarm at its 1966 meeting at the practical infallibility
attributed to spectrographic voice identification by
Kersta and the popular press which reported his con-
clusions. See Kersta, NATURE; N.Y. Times, April 12,
1966, § L, at 1, col. 2. Several members of the committee
undertook to review the reliability of the technique
and to dispel certain allusions to fingerprint identifi-
cation. Their findings and recommendations for vali-
dation of the technique are presented in Bolt, Rdiabil-
ity 606-08. A general summary may be found in Bolt,
et al., Identification of a Speaker by Speech Spectrograms,
166 ScENcEx 338 (1969).




States. Ladefoged there stated that he would
accept Tosi's 6% false identification figure as a
"rough estimate" of the technique's accuracy. 5
Judicial Reaction
Those reported cases which have discussed the
admissibility of spectrographic voice identification
testimony since publication of the Tosi study
have justified admitting such testimony by re-
ferring to the general rule laid down in Frye, ar-
guing that scientific opinion of the technique is
now favorable. These courts have felt that the
Tosi study should be taken to validate the tech-
nique generally as a reliable method of voice iden-
tification, leaving the further unresolved questions
as to voice similarity among smaller, more homo-
geneous groups as affecting only the weight and
credibility of the identification testimony. It can
be argued with some force, though, that Tosi's
extrapolations, like those of Kersta, are premature.
While Tosi's results are impressive, they do not
support the further inference that the technique
is reliable as a general principle in other than the
laboratory test conditions: the quantum of re-
liability in other applications yet knows no limit.
Notwithstanding the readiness now of the scien-
tific community to accept the technique, the re-
quirement of analytical validity expressed in Cop-
polino is not met by an experiment which pro-
duces a range of error which is presently unde-
fined.96
The essential underpinning of the decision in
United States v. Wright,97 that unanimity among
experts is not a requirement for admissibility,
seems to have also formed the basis for the Min-
95 The text of Ladefoged's opinion reads, in pertinent
part:
If I were asked to testify on the validity of the sys-
tem, I would have to emphasize that we do not at
the moment know the probable error rate. But I
would accept a minimum of 6% as a rough esti-
mate of the possibility of making a misidentifica-
tion (assuming, of course, that there was no ques-
tion of women, mimics, or disguised voices being
involved, and that the identification had been made
by an experienced, responsible, investigator).
Letter, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
06All evidence must, of course, be probative. See
note 56 supra. When there is no support for the propo-
sition that a technique is accurate within certain tol-
erance limits, the probativeness of evidence based on
the technique is substantially reduced. A strong argu-
ment can be made that such evidence should be "ex-
cluded because altogether lacking in probative value."
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 448
n.2 (1971), citing Tribe, supra note 18, at 1342 n.40.
See also note 81 supra.
17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967). See
note 53 supra.
nesota Supreme Court's opinion in State ex rel.
Trimble v. Hedman,93 the first reported appellate
opinion to consider the impact of the Tosi study.
It was there held that a voice identification by
spectrographic voice analysis, if corroborated by
aural identification, was of sufficient probative
value to form probable cause for the issuance of
an arrest warrant for a young woman. Although
the procedural posture of the case99 prevented
the court from ruling squarely on the question
of the admissibility of such evidence, the court
indicated that it. felt spectrographic voice identi-
fication was sufficiently accepted in the scientific
community to warrant the admissibility at trial
of expert testimony based thereon.'9
Ladefoged, testifying for the defense in the
original habeas corpus hearing, stated that al-
though he and other members of the scientific
community accepted Tosi's experiments as far
as they went,' he would exercise more caution
in extrapolating those results to prove the general
validity and reliability of the technique. In his
testimony for the state, Tosi disagreed, claiming
that provided the examiner is properly trained,
listens to the speech samples to be compared spec-
trographically, and is permitted to spend as much
time as he requires, the technique is highly re-
liable.'9 ' Tosi also disagreed with Ladefoged's
contention that the sex of the speaker impaired
the technique's reliability in any way.
With regard to the degree of reliability required
of a scientific technique, the court noted that
mere disagreement over the fallibility of a scien-
tific technique would not render an expert's opin-
ion, based on the technique, inadmissible.'9 Al-
91...Minn-, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971).
19 The case was before the state supreme court on
a habeas corpus appeal. Trimble had been arrested on
the strength of a warrant listing a spectrographic
identification of her voice as the same as that of a
caller who had telephoned the St. Paul Police Depart-
ment requesting assistance. When the officers responded
one was killed by a sniper.
°0.Mainn. at_-, 192 N.W.2d at 444. In the trial
subsequent to the Minnesota court's opinion, Trimble
did not contest the admission into evidence of the voice
identification. Instead, she took the stand and testified
that although it was she who placed the call, she was
unaware that criminal acts might result. Letter froth
Assistant Ramsey County Attorney Paul E. Lindholm
to the author, May 12, 1972, on file in the editorial
offices of the Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology &
Police Science.01
.-Minn. aLt_, 192 N.W.2d at 440.
10 2 Id. aLt, 192 N.W.2d at 439.
Im Id. aL.., 192 N.W.2d at 440. While the general
proposition stated by the court is true, applied here it is
merely conclusory. If the scientific community, or even
the specialty field, is divided equally, the probative
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though the Trimble court was correct in stating
that the infallibility of a scientific technique or
device is not a prerequisite to admissibility,0 4
the expected rate of error is a matter to be con-
sidered in deciding whether to admit identifica-
tion testimony based on a novel technique.1 5
If Ladefoged's reservation regarding the con-
fusability of voices in other samplings is valid,
then the expected rate of error has only a likely
minimum, with no real evidence to sustain a prob-
able maximum.
While the Trimble court recognized that the
precise question before it was narrower than the
broader admissibility issue faced by Cary, King,
and Wright, it nevertheless noted that:
[Wn the trial of the case spectograms [sic] ought to
be admissible for the purpose of corroborating
voice identification by aural means if a sufficient
foundation is laid to satisfy the trial judge that the
expert whose opinion is sought is qualified to assist
the fact finder in coming to the right conclusion l06
This statement, although dicta, has already had
substantial legal effect10 7 The court seemed con-
vinced that the technique had advanced to the
point where judicial notice could be taken of its
reliability, the only bar to its admissibility being
its use by an unqualified voice identification ex-
pert.
At least two federal courts have followed the
lead of the Minnesota Supreme Court. In United
States v. PhoenixM' the trial judge admitted evi-
dence of a spectrographic identification after hear-
ing extensive testimony by both Tosi and Ernest
Nash, a voice identification expert with the Mich-
igan State Police. In a written opinion, a District
of Columbia trial judge in United States v. Ray-
value of a technique is in perfect equipoise and the
high degree of probativeness required of scientific
evidence is not present. Given the serious questions
with regard to the relationship of the non-tested vari-
ables to the accuracy of the technique, disagreement
among experts should in fact render evidence based
on the technique inadmissible.
104 It is doubtful that infallibility for a scientific
technique is or should be a prerequisite for its admis-
sibility. See 3 WiGmooE § 990; McCoRmcK, Deception
Tests and the Law of Evidence, 15 CA . L. REv. 484,
500 (1927).
105 See note 88 supra.
106 .Minn. at.-, 192 N.W.2d at 444 (emphasis
added).
117 See the discussion of United States v. Raymond,
337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972), in the text accom-
panying notes 109-11 infra. See, e.g., the authorities
cited in note 112 infra.10- No. 70-CR-428 (S.D. Ind. April 15, 1971).
mondi0 ruled squarely on the admissibility ques-
tion. After hearing testimony by Tosi, Nash, and
Ladefoged, the court held that sufficient scientific
acceptance had been demonstrated for admission
of such identification evidence at trial.un The
court based its ruling on a determination that
the Tosi study had remedied the two major de-
fects of Kersta's experiments: a homogeneous,
rather than heterogeneous, sampling of voices
was used, as was a true identification task. But
the court was also swayed to a large degree by
the substantial change in attitude of the scientific
community, most notably by Ladefoged, who as
a witness for the govenment in Raymond testified
in favor of the admission of spectrograms."'
In addition to the Trimble, Phoenix, and Ray-
mond cases, a number of other trial courts have
reconsidered the admissibility question in light
of the results found by the Tosi study, and have
ruled the evidence admissible.m Notwithstanding
this rather dramatic turnabout in judicial and
scientific opinion concerning the validity and re-
liability of the technique, however, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, after thoroughly studying
109 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972).
uo Id. at 645.
m It is not entirely clear from the opinion Ladefoged's
exact testimony on this point. Ladefoged has indicated
that the experience and methods employed by Nash,
the voice identification expert of the Michigan State
Police who testified as an expert identification witness
in Raymond, render an opinion based on spectrographic
voice analysis extremely reliable, even considering the
various unknown factors such as confusability and the
effect of other untested variabilities. Ladefoged's
testimony appears to be essentially that contained in
his letter to Dr. David, supra note 2, set forth in note
95 supra.
"'See, e.g., People v. Law, Crim. No. 26331 (Fresno,
Calif., Super. Ct., April 30, 1972); State v. Alea, Crim.
No. 70-9397 (Dade County, Fla., Crim. Ct., Oct. 8,
1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-1419, Fla. App., Dec.
21, 1971; State v. Worley, Crim. No. 70-1095 (Orange
County, Fla., Crim. Ct., May 4, 1971); People v.
Merholz, Nos. 71-MC2-52660/71-MC2-52661 (Ev-
anston, Ill., Mun. Ct.), stricken with leave to reinstate(Nov. 1, 1971); State v. Crowe, (St. Louis, Mo., Crim.
Ct., Jan. 20, 1972), in Chicago Tribune, Jan. 22 1972,§ 1, at 3, col. 1. In both State v. DiGilio, No. 421-68
(Middlesex County, N.J., Ct., Law Div., March 12,
1970), and State v. Krapp, App. No. 37-68 (Somerset
County, N.J., Ct., Law Div., May 9, 1969), evidence of
a spectrographic voice elimination was admitted not-
withstanding the fact that the Tosi study was incom-
plete and unevaluated, save partially by the partici-
pants therein. It should be noted that New Jersey
does not permit the use at trial, of polygraph test re-
suilts, even when both parties stipulate. State v. Driver,
38 N.J. 255, 183 A.2d 655 (1962). It is thus questionable
whether the courts' ruling admitting the exclusionary




the matter, has not moved to accept spectrographic
voice identification in other than investigative
situations.113
A recent New Jersey case, State v. Andretta,u
4
however, has adhered to the exclusionary result
reached by the court in State v. Cary. Despite the
precedent set by Trimble and Raymond, both cited
in the opinion, and the radical change in scientific
thought on the technique's accuracy and relia-
bility as a result of the Tosi study, the court
noted that:
The evidence offered for the purpose of showing
scientific acceptance did not go so far as to include
acceptance of the proposition that the technique
would result in a scientifically reliable identifica-
tion or elimination by the expert, but merely that
the study of Dr. Tosi, so far as it went, was conducted
in accordance with valid scientif* standards."5
The court in Andretta was not presented squarely
with an admissibility question. Rather, the state
had requested a court order to compel the de-
fendants in the case to submit voice exemplars
for spectrographic comparison with spectrograms
made from exemplars taken nearly four years
before. The court was unimpressed with the testi-
mony of Tosi, Ladefoged, and Nash that time-
lapses of greater than one month would have no
appreciable effect on the accuracy of an examiner's
identification or elimination. Because the Tosi
study had only tested the effect of a one month
time-lapse on the accuracy of the technique, the
court did not feel that the further inference that
no statistically significant differences would be
found in greater time-lapse situations could be
drawn. 1 6
113 The late FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover stated, in
response to a request for FBI policy on the question,
that in view of the many unresolved questions which
may strike at the heart of the technique's reliability:
[We feel that the comparison of voiceprints is use-
ful as an investigative guide but has not been proven
sufficiently well authenticated to serve as a reliable
basis for expert testimony, as to identity, at this
time.
Letter from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, to the author, December 21, 1971, on
file in the editorial offices of the Journal of Criminal
Law, Criminology & Police Science. The position of the
Bureau remains unchanged. Letter from L. Patrick
Gray Ill, Acting Director, Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, to the author, June 15, 1972, on file in
the editorial offices of the Journal.
" Crim. Indict. Nos. 445-66/446-66 (Middlesex
County, N.J., Ct., Law Div., May 4, 1972).
U5 Id., slip op. at 7-8.11 Id., slip op. at 16-20.
CONCLUSION
The Tosi study and the scientific respect ac-
corded it clearly go a long way toward establishing
spectrographic voice analysis as a reliable method
of voice identification. Since the technique may
be used to exclude 17 as well as to identify, its
forensic applicability will benefit prosecution and
defense alike.
Although recent case law supports the admis-
sibility of such identification testimony, there are
significant unquantified variables which may have
an as yet undetermined effect on the accuracy
'and reliability of spectrographic voice analysis.
The courts ought to look carefully at the evidence
marshalled to support the general admissibility
of such an identification until further experimen-
tation establishes the relationship which these
variables have on the examiner's proficiency.
While the technique certainly possesses sufficient
reliability to render an identification admissible
on stipulation, at least in those jurisdictions which
allow such use of polygraph test results,' the
courts ought not be too eager to embrace a tech-
nique which has only recently been rescued from
an abyss of scientific scorn-a rescue accomplished
by the narrow experimental data produced in
one study.
Even in those jurisdictions where evidence of
a spectrographic voice identification is adjudged
admissible, the bench or jury can and should be
made fully aware of the inadequate knowledge
speech scientists have of the many factors which
influence speech production. While the fact finder
is entitled to have before it all available data which
possesses a reasonable level of probativeness, the
danger of prejudice in using a technique, the ac-
curacy of which is so heavily dependent on un-
defined variables and the ethics, training, and
general responsibility of the examiner, would seem
to tip the scales toward exclusion, notwithstanding
the technique's "scientific acceptance." Courts can-
not wave Frye as a talisman directing admissibility;
they may not abdicate their responsibilities by
blindly following general scientific acceptance.
11 See note 112 supra.
118 See, e.g., State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d
894 (1962). The Valdez opinion, however, conditioned
even this restricted use of the polygraph technique's
results on requirements that the court and jury be
made fully aware of the possibilities for error inherent
in the technique.
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SKYJACKING:
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS RAISED BY
ANTI-HIJACKING SYSTEMS
The introduction of anti-hijacking systems using
magnetometers' and passenger profile analyses'
raises familiar constitutional issues in a new con-
text. These systems, which were designed to iden-
tify weapon-carrying skyjackers, have also proved
useful for spotting other kinds of lawbreakers,
including narcotics violators and aliens who have
entered the United States illegally.3
I A magnetometer is a metal detecting device. It is
installed in the passageway leading to an airplane for
the purpose of detecting passengers who are carrying
objects of a certain weight metal. There are different
types of magnetometers but all are set to give some
kind of signal when such a metal object is carried past.
See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1085(E.D.N.Y. 1971).
2 The profile analysis was developed by a government
task force which used statistical, sociological, and
psychological data and techniques to discover certain
characteristics thought to set hijackers apart from
other air passengers. See id. at 1086. According to the
Lopez court a passenger who meets the profile require-
ments is focused on by airline employees; if he also
triggers the magnetometer he is then "interviewed" by
airline personnel. If he cannot produce satisfactory
identification a United States Marshal is summoned to
search him. Id. at 1083. According to one sample, of
500,000 screened passengers .28% (1,406) satisfied the
profile. Half of these passengers were allowed to board
immediately because they did not activate the mag-
netometer, leaving 712 or .14% to be interviewed. Of
those interviewed about one third (283) were actually
searched. Twenty passengers were denied boarding and
16 of these were arrested. Id. at 1084.
3 According to figures released by Wayne B. Colburn,
Director of the United States Marshals Service (a
branch of the United States Department of Justice),
1,926 arrests were made between October 15, 1969, the
beginning of the Marshals Service Air Piracy Program,
and December 15, 1971. Of these, 205 persons were
arrested for possession of concealed firearms and 133
for possession of other concealed deadly weapons.
Five hundred thirty-eight persons were arrested for
violation of narcotics laws and $15,105,065 worth of
narcotics were seized. The Marshals Service claims
credit for the successful abortion of 15 hijacking inci-
dents since the Program began. In an article in the New
York Times, Nov. 2, 1971, at 1, col. 4, it was reported
that, while the value of the anti-hijacking program for
deterring hijackers is not yet clear, authorities have said
it has had a significant effect in helping to apprehend
suspected criminals on other charges. According to this
article, most of the more than 1,000 arrests made last
year as a result of anti-hijacking systems were on
charges unrelated to hijacking. More than 400 people
were arrested for possession of narcotics and about the
same number were arrested as illegal aliens, while about
300 were arrested for attempting to board an airplane
with a firearm.
Questions relating to fourth, fifth, and sixth
amendment rights have been raised in connection
with these anti-hijacking systems as well as issues
relating to the right to travel.4 It is the purpose of
this comment to discuss these issues as they relate
to anti-hijacking systems and to determine whether
these systems interfere with fundamental consti-
tutional rights of air passengers-and, if so, to what
extent such interference may be justified.
A recent district court case, United States v.
Lopez5, considered these questions. The court up-
held the use of a particular anti-hijacking system
but suppressed heroin found on the defendant as a
result of its use because the "elegant and objective"
system devised by the government s to deter and
apprehend hijackers was distorted in an "irra-
tional and prejudicial" way by airline personnel.7
The court heard facts and arguments concerning
a profile analysis system which the airline used,8
4 Although there is no explicit mention of this right
in the Constitution, it has long been recognized as a
basic right and has been variously construed as coming
under the privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CoNsT.
art. IV, § 2, the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, and the fifth and fourteenth amedments. See
Shapiro v. Thomspon, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); 'Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
5328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as Lopez].
6 In 1968 a task force was appointed to consider
methods of curtailing hijackings. Included on the task
force were representatives from the Federal Aeronautics
Administration, the Justice Department and the Com-
merce Department. They researched the characteristics
of all known hijackers and found that they shared
certain characteristics which set them apart from the
rest of the air traveling public. On the basis of these
findings the group recommended certain procedures to
try to deter hijackings, including use of a magnetometer
to identify those passengers carrying metal and a
profile analysis based on the characteristics which the
group felt were peculiar to hijackers. See id. at 1082-83.
7 Id. at 1081, 1101. A Pan American passenger service
manager had issued a memorandum purporting to
"update" the profile analysis in an unauthorized man-
ner. In so doing, the agent eliminated one characteristic
which the court considered fundamental and added two
others which the court found unacceptable. One in-
troduced an ethnic element for which there was no ex-
perimental basis, creating an equal protection problem,
and the other required an act of individual judgment by
airline employees which the court concluded destroyed
the neutrality and objectivity of the approved profile.
8 This profile, resulting from the task force study,
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but excluded the public and the defendant from
this part of the trial, thus raising a sixth amend-
ment question.9 The court concluded that the ex-
clusion of the public and defendant was justified
because of the dangers involved in revealing such
information." The court also disposed of a fifth
amendment question;" it determined that the
characteristics included in the profile were not
discriminatory and that the profile when properly
used did not violate equal protection standards.1
2
On the fourth amendment 3 question of the search
itself, the court said there was no implied consent,
as the government contended, nor.was the search
incident to an arrest; however, the court held that
it was justified under Terry v. Ohio0 4 as a protective
search for weapons. 5 Although admitting that use
of such a system is "disquieting," ' 6 the court held
that contraband seized as a result of a proper
was composed of several characteristics in which hi-jackers differed from other air passengers, according
to the Lopez court, and which could be observed without
exercise of judgment. Id. at 1086.
9 "In all criminal prosections, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial ... [and]
to be confronted with the witnesses against him ..
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
"0 See text accompanying notes 18-42 infra.
n "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.... ." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954),
where violations of equal protection standards were
also considered violation of due process under the fifth
amendment.
1328 F. Supp. at 1086-87, 1100. See text accom-
panying notes 35-36 infra. Based on in camera hearings
the court concluded that studies utilizing statistical,
sociological and psychological data were thorough and
that the resulting profile was highly effective in isolating
potential hijackers. The court was satisfied that the
profile did not discriminate against any group on the
basis of religion, origin, political views or race. But see
note 3 supra indicating that the system is effective in
identifying criminals in general, not just potential
hijackers.
"1 The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated.., and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause ....
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. See text accompanying notes
43-78 infra.
1 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry a self-protective search
by a police officer who reasonably believed that an
individual, whose suspicious behavior he was inves-
tigating, might be armed was held proper and not
violative of the fourth amendment. See text accom-
panying notes 50-75 infra.
1328 F. Supp. at 1092-98. Relying on statistical
evidence and a balancing of competing interests of the
individual and of society, the court concluded that
there was probable cause for the search in this case
based on the recognition in Terry that an officer's
search could be justified if necessary to protect himself
or others from possible danger.
I$Id. at 1100.
investigatory search based on information gen-
erated by a well administered federal anti-hijacking
'system is admissible as evidence.
In .Lopez the evidence was suppressed because
the system was altered by an airline employee. 7
If this had not occurred, however, there were sev-
eral constitutional grounds on which the defendant
could have appealed.
ExcLuSION FROm THE CouR'mooM
The first constitutional ground concerns the
exclusion of the public and the defendant from the
part of the trial involving testimony on the profile
analysis system used by the airlines. The sixth
amendment guarantees all criminal defendants
the right to a public trial." In addition to furnish-
ing protection for the accused, this right has been
construed as a protection of a public interest-the
right-of the public to know what occurs at criminal
trials.1" Despite the general presumption that
criminal defendafits are entitled to a public trial,
courts have upheld many exceptions." Courts are
'7 See note 7 supra.
"8See note 9 supra. This practice has its roots in the
English common law and was established in several
states even before the sixth amendment was ratified in
1791. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-67 (1948),
discussing the history and development of this right.
See also Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1965).
In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), the Court
stated:
We start with the proposition that it is a "public
trial" that the Sixth Amendment guarantees to
the "accused." The purpose of the requirement of
a public trial was to guarantee that the accused
would be fairly dealt with and not unjustly con-
demned. History has proved that secret tribunals
were effective instruments of oppression.
Id. at 538-39.
" In holding that the defendant's right to a public
trial was violated when the judge excluded the public
from a home where he and court officials had gone to
take testimony, the reviewing court in Lewis v. Peyton,
352 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1965), stated that the right to a
public trial is not solely for the protection of the accused
but is also for protection of the public's right to know
what occurs in criminal trials because
a secrbt trial can result in favor to as well as un-just prosecution of a defendant. Thus we would be
loath to hold that an accused may waive his
right to a public trial ....
Id. at 792.
2" One of the most common reasons for exclusion of
the public is the preservation of order in the courtroom.
See United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. Orlando v. Follette,
384 U.S. 1008 (1966). See also United States ex rd.
Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969), cerl.
denied, 397 U.S. 957 (1970). At times courts have held
that restrictions on certain individuals were necessary,
particularly members of the press and other news
media. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966);
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Geise v. United
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less likely, however, to allow exclusion of the de-
fendant himself in criminal cases. Defendants are
entitled to be present at their trials under the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments and the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment.? However, this right to be present is
not absolute.
23
The Lopez court found its main support for ex-
cluding the defendant from in, camera hearings on
the anti-hijacking system by drawing an analogy
to cases in which the government is allowed to pro-
tect the identity of an informer. Under the in-
former privilege the government may refuse to re-
veal the identity of a person who has furnished a
law enforcement officer with information on an al-
leged crime.24 There are certain limitations to this
rule. First, the privilege applies only to the identity
of the informer and not to the contents of his com-
munication. 2- Second, no privilege exists if the
identity of the informer is known by those who
would have cause to resent the communication. 26
States, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 842 (1959).
21 See Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442 (1892);
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). But see Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), overruled on other
grounds, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The
Court in Snyder distinguished the due process clause
from the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment,
noting that a criminal defendant had the right to be
present at his trial when evidence was offered and
witnesses were interrogated. However, the Court did
not feel that the due process clause required the de-
fendant's presence at all times during the trial, but
rather only when a fair hearing would be thwarted by
his absence. Holding that denial of defendant's request
to attend a viewing of the scene of the crime was not a
violation of due process, the Court stated:
[Diefendant has the privilege under the Fourteenth
Amendment to be present in his own person when-
ever his presence has a relation, reasonably sub-
stantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend
against the charge.
291 U.S. at 105-06.
2 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); United
States v. Crutcher, 405 F. 2d 239 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969); FED. R. CRns. P. 43.
2 In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), the Su-
preme Court held that a defendant could be removed
from the trial because of his own disruptive conduct.
Courts have also held that a defendant can voluntarily
waive his right to be present at trial, or some portion of
it. See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912),
United States v. Dalli, 424 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.), cerl.
denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970).24 See 8 J. W2GmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (McNaughton
rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WiGMoRE]; Proposed
Rules of Evidence, Rule 510 (March 1971), 51 F.R.D.
315, 378 [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rules of Evi-
dence]. But see Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53
(1957). See also McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).2 See 8 WiGMoR, § 2374; Roviaro v. United States,
353 U.S. 53 (1957).2
6See 8 WIaMORE § 2374; Henrick Mannerfrid, Inc.
Third, even when the privilege is applicable, the
court may compel disclosure if it appears necessary
for a fair determination of a relevant issue.
2 7
It is difficult to apply the court's informer anal-
ogy to hijacking cases.28 It is not the identity of
the informer2 9 which is in issue-the system itself
is the informer and it is known that the system is
composed of a magnetometer and a profile analysis.
What is in issue is the basis for relying on the sys-
tem-the system's contents which direct the singl-
ing out of a particular individual.30 Under the in-
former rule contents of a communication are not
privileged.3 If disclosure of the contents of his
statement would tend to disclose the identity of
the informer the communication could come within
the privilege, but only to the extent necessary to
preserve the informant's anonymity.
Even if the privilege were construed to include
contents as well as identity it should not be sus-
tained in hijacking cases. In Roviaro v. United
Statesn the Court held:
Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or
of the contents of his communication, is relevant
v. Teegarden, 23 F.R.D. 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). In
Mannerfrid the court held that since the informer was
already identified the privilege was no longer applicable
because it was limited only to his identity and did not
extend to his communication.
2 The Supreme Court in Roviaro v. United States,
353 U.S. 53 (1957), reversed the defendant's conviction
because of the government's refusal to identify the in-
formant, stating that when such identity is relevant or
helpful to the defense the privilege cannot be invoked.
2 8 The court stated that the anti-hijacking system
itself acts as an informer and noted that the reliability
of the information which it gives depends on the nature
of the profile and how well it is applied by airline per-
sonnel. The court added that there is a stronger case
for nondisclosure to the defendant because the inform-
ant is an objective system whose credibility the de-
fendant could not impugn by his presence. 328 F. Supp.
at 1092. However, the court ignored the fact that if the
defendant knew the characteristics in the profile he
might be able to argue that he did not fit them and
therefore the profile was not properly applied by airline
personnel. He also could argue that the characteristics
chosen were discriminatory and he could present wit-
nesses in an attempt to show that there was an inade-
quate foundation for their inclusion in the profile.
v The main reason for protecting the identity of in-
formants is to encourage them to come forward with
information without fear of recriminations. See, e.g., Mc-
Cray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
30 This information is analogous to the contents of an
informer's report, i.e., his reasons for believing that a
crime has been committed by a particular person.
31 See note 25 su pTa.
2 8 WiGmoRE § 2374. There is an exception to this
rule in cases where the communication, on its own
merits, qualifies as a military or state secret. See 8
WiGmoRE § 2378; text accompanying notes 37-39 infra.
353 U.S. 53 (1957).
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and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is es-
sential to a fair determination of a cause, the privi-
lege must give way.34
There are considerable possibilities for misuse or
abuse of anti-hijacking systems.35 Knowledge of the
contents of the profile would help guard against
misuse. Such information is necessary to establish
the system's basic reliability and fairness and to
determine whether it was properly applied in a
given case. This information is essential to deter-
mine whether the classifications within the profile
meet the standards of the equal protection clause; 6
14 Id. at 60-61. The Court added that there should
be no fixed rule, but the question of whether a proper
balance renders nondisclosure erroneous depends on the
circumstances, considering such factors as the crime
charged, defenses available, and possible significance of
an informer's testimony. Id. at 62. But see McCray v.
Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), in which the Court upheld
the refusal to compel disclosure of an informant's
identity in a preliminary hearing to establish probable
cause for arrest and search. The Court distinguished
Roviaro by saying that it involved not a preliminary
hearing, but the trial itself, and that the disclosure in
Roviaro went more directly to the issue of guilt or in-
nocence than that in McCray. Id. at 309. See People v.
Nettles, 34 Ill. 2d 52, 213 N.E.2d 536 (1966); People v.
Durr, 28 Ill. 2d 308, 192 N.E.2d 379 (1963). See also
United States v. Winters, 420 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1970);
United States v. Jackson, 384 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968).
35 There is a fundamental question as to whether any
system based solely on machines and statistical data
which physically and psychologically analyzes a group
of unsuspecting citizens, before any crime has taken
place, should be upheld as a justification for searching
selected individuals. The Lopez court recognized this,
noting that under our criminal law people are not con-
demned because they are potentially dangerous but
are prosecuted only for illegal acts.-However, without
explaining why, the court concluded that in this case
no such result was accomplished. 328 F. Supp. at 1100.
But cf. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice
in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371
(1970). The use of machines, scientific tests and sta-
tistics for purposes of gathering and serving as evidence
at trials raises additional problems. See notes 63, 69
infra. There is the possibility that the system could be
devised to trap other law violators (such as narcotics
possessors) under the guise of searching for hijackers.
Many more narcotics violators have been caught by
the system than weapons carriers. See note 3 supra.
Even if the system is carefully devised to be reliable
and fair, there is always the danger that it will be mis-
used by the people who operate or apply it. It is diffi-
cult to insure against misuse resulting from individual
suspicions and prejudices. The Lopez court noted that
continuous supervision of persons having this power
was essential and that the system required evaluation
in light of the skill and dedication of those operating it.
(328 F. Supp. at 1101-02.) However, the court did
not set any specific standards.
36 Courts have held that "invidious distinctions"
and classifications depriving people of basic rights
without a compelling governmental interest violate the
equal protection clause. In hijacking cases neither the
public nor defendant has knowledge of the characteris-
without knowledge of the profile's contents the
defendant is foreclosed from raising this issue of
possible violation of his fifth amendment rights.
Therefore, under the Roviaro rule, use of the privi-
lege is clearly unacceptable.
The rule applying to military and state secrets,
which was rejected by the Lopez court, provides a
closer analogy for justifying non-disclosure of the
contents of the profile. This rule allows the govern-
ment to refuse to give evidence, or to prevent any-
one else from giving evidence, upon a showing of
reasonable likelihood that disclosure would be det-
rimental to the public security, national defense or
international relations of the United Statesyr Since
most hijacked airplanes are flown out of the United
States, often to unfriendly countries, there is a
le gtimate governmental interest in preventing
such diversions, as they could develop into serious
international conflicts.n Under this rule, if a party
is deprived of material evidence because of the
privilege, the judge may strike the testimony, find
against the government on that issue, or dismiss
the action if justice requires. 9 In United States v.
Andolschek'0 the court refused to allow exclusion of
tics making up the profile. There could exist an invidious
type of discrimination involving criteria such as race or
national origin for which there is no adequate statisticaljustification. Any time that a particular group of people
is singled out and deprived of a basic constitutional
right (here the right to travel and the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures) an equal
protection issue is raised. In Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Court held that-denial of wel-
fare benefits to residents who had not resided in thejurisdiction for at least one year was a classification
which violated the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.
But in moving from State to State or to the District
of Columbia appellees were exercising a constitu-
tibnal right, and any classification which serves to
p'enalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to
be necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest, is unconstitutional.
Id. at 634. Cf. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160(1941). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944), a controversial case in which exclusion of
people of Japanese ancestry from West Coast military
areas was held constitutional. In his opinion, Justice
Black stated that all restrictions on a single racial
group are immediately suspect, but that "pressing
public necessity" may sometimes justify the existence
of such restrictions. Id. at 216. Although the classifica-
tion was upheld in Korematsu, it was emphasized that
the justification was furnished by the War Power of
the United States. Id. at 223. See also Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
37 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953);
8 WiGMoRE § 2378. But cf. United States v. Beekman,
155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Andols-
chek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
us See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
39 See note 37 supra.
40142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
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certain reports relating to a criminal case, saying:
The government must choose; either it must leave
the transactions in the obscurity from which a trial
will draw them, or it must expose them fully. Nor
does it seem to us possible to draw any line between
documents whose contents bear directly upon the




Thus one of the same reasons for not allowing ex-
clusions under the informer rule-because the
material pertains to a relevant issue in the deter-
mination of guilt or innocence in a criminal trial-
is a reason to refuse exclusion under the military
and state secrets rule.
Neither the informer privilege nor the state
secrets doctrine clearly applies as a basis for exclud-
ing the defendant and public in such a case. Yet
there is an undeniable danger to the usefulness of
the system-and thus to the air traveling public-
if the contents of the system are revealed. As a
matter of public policy and necessity perhaps a new
rule is needed, using the analogy to the state and
military secrets rule as a basis for justifying some
incursion into constitutionally protected areas.
A balancing test should be used2 in determining
whether, even though such cases do not come under
a specific established exception, the immediate
danger to the public outweighs the traditional rule
that defendants and the public have a right to be
present at criminal trials. In applying this balanc-
ing test, some interrelated constitutional problems
should be considered.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The fourth amendment requirement of probable
cause raises serious questions about the use of
anti-hijacking systems and resulting searches.
There are several exceptions to the general require-
"' Id. at 506. But cf. United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. I (1953), a civil case based on a tort claim against
the government, in which the Court said:
In each case, the showing of necessity which is
made will determine how far the court should probe
in satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the
privilege is appropriate. Where there is a strong
showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should
not be lightly accepted, but even the most compel-
ling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privi-
lege if the court is ultimately satisfied that mili-
tary secrets are at stake.
Id. at 11. The Court indicated that a different rule
might apply in a criminal case. However, it did nbt de-
cide that question.
42See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11(1953); United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506
(2d Cir. 1944).
41 See note 13 supra.
ment of probable cause to search. When an officer
reasonably believes that an individual whose sus-
picious behavior he is investigating might be
armed, he may conduct a self-protective search."
A search is also allowed without a warrant if it is
incident to a lawful arrest, 45 and searches are al-
lowed when made with the suspect's voluntary and
knowledgeable consent.
46
The exception for situations in which a search
is incident to a lawful arrest would not apply in hi-
jacking cases. The arrest does not occur until after
the search has been completed.47 Evidence found
in a search may not be used as justification for an
arrest if there was not prior cause for the search."
The Lopez court rejected the notion of implied con-
sent, stating that the government could not condi-
tion the defendant's right to travel on the volun-
tary relinquishment of his fourth amendment
rights.
49
Instead the court relied on the standard set forth
in Terry v. Ohio50 allowing a self-protective search
for weapons by a police officer who reasonably be-
lieves that an individual whose suspicious behavior
he is investigating may be armed. The Terry court
emphasized that the central inquiry under the
fourth amendment is the "reasonableness in all
the circumstances" 11 of the particular invasion of
the citizen's personal security. The Court noted
that whether such action is called a "stop and
frisk" or a "search and seizure," it is nonetheless
clearly within the purview of the fourth amend-
ment, and, being a "serious intrusion upon the
"Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
11 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33 (1970); Agnello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).46 See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946).
But see United States v. Como, 340 F.2d 891 (2d Cir.
1965). See also Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal
After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 CoLutr. L. REv. 130
1967).
4 An arrest is made after a search by a United States
Marshal if the search discloses a weapon or other illegal
article. See Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1083.
48 Evidence seized as a result of such a search is not
admissible at trial. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
Holding that there was no probable cause for arrest
until after a search revealed envelopes of heroin, the
Sibron Court said:
It is axiomatic that an incident search may not
precede an arrest and serve as part of its justifica-
tion.
392 U.S. at 63.
49 328 F. Supp. at 1093. See Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966); Apthecker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964). But see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
60 392 U.S. 1 (1968).61 d. at 19.
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sanctity of the person," 5 2 is not to be undertaken
lightly by police officers. According to the Court,
in determining whether the officer acted reasonably
due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled
to draw from the facts in light of his experience."
The Terry Court set forth a dual test for deciding
whether the search and geizure were reasonable-
first, was the officer's action justified at its incep-
tion, and second, was it reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the inter-
ference.14 In assessing the reasonableness of the
officer's conduct, the Court said it was first neces-
sary to examine the governmental interest allegedly
justifying the intrusion, for "there- is no ready test
for determining reasonableness other than by bal-
ancing the need to'search (or seize) against the
invasion which the search (or seizure) entails." 51
The Court said that a search without probable
cause to arrest must be limited strictly to that
which is necessary for discovery of weapons 6
which could be used against the officer or others
nearby.57
12 Id. at 17. The Court added that a public search
by a policeman of a citizen standing helplessly is not a
"petty indignity." For a graphic description of apoliceman's search for weapons see Priar & Martin,
Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45 J. CRrn. L.C.
& P.S. 481 (1954).
"Id. at 27. Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160 (1949).
'392 U.S. at 19-20.
61 Id. at 21, citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967). The Court added that in assessing
reasonableness a simple good faith test would not be
adequate, but facts must be judged against an objec-
tive standard and tested by the question of whether "a
man of reasonable caution" would be warranted inbelieving that the action taken was appropriate. 392U.S. at 21-22. Cf. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964);Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).56392 U.S. at 29. The Court found that the police
officer only patted down the outer clothing of the de-fendant and his companions and did not place his handsin their pockets or under the outer surfaces of their
clothes until he felt weapons. The Court specifically
stated that the officer did not conduct a general ex-ploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal ac-
tivity he might find. The Court concluded that the gun
seized from Terry was admissible as evidence againsthim because of the limited scope of the search and be-
cause the officer had reasonable grounds to believe thedefendant was armed and dangerous. See id. at 29-30.
"In strictly limiting the scope of the search to a
self-protective search for weapons the Court emphasized
that such a search would not be justified by any needto prevent disappearance or destruction of evidence of
crime, but rather must be confined in scope only to anintrusion reasonably designed to discover hidden
weapons or instruments which could be used to assault
the police officer. Id. at 29.
Thus, under Terry standards there must be some
prior indication of danger in order for an officer to
stop a suspect and search him, though it need not
be so strong as is required for probable cause to ar-
rest a suspect. 5 The Lopez court admitted that
mere statistical evidence alone could not justify a
search and if it were known that 6% of the people in
a given community carried guns, the police would
not be justified in stopping and searching people
on the street arbitrarily to determine whether they
had weapons.5 9 Discussing the anti-hijacking sys-
tem, the'court noted that one out of every 15 per-
sons searched is armed 60-a probability of about
6%-and concluded that because of "the substan-
tial interest in preserving the integrity and safety
of air travel" a 6 % danger of weapons was sufficient
to justify a frisk.6' However, the Terry Court speci-
fically stated that a cursory weapons search had to
be based on something more than an inarticulate
hunch.62 In hijacking cases, the indication of danger
is furnished solely by the profile analysis and the
magnetometer, the actual scientific value of the
latter being very slight. It is quite possible that
68 Id. at 27. See The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82
HARv. L. REv. 63, 184 (1968) which interprets this to
mean that for arrest there must be a probability of
guilt, but for stop and frisk there must be only a prob-
ability of impending criminal activity.
"Such harrassment by police without more ob-jective evidence of criminal activity or a legiti-
mate investigative purpose is proscribed by the
Fourth Amendment.
328 F. Supp. at 1097-98. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1, 13-15.
0 328 F. Supp. at 1084. See note 2 supra.61328 F. Supp. at 1097.
62 392 U.S. at 22, 27.
6The court indicated an awareness of the limited
investigatory powers of the machine noting that 50%
of the persons passing through trigger it, but felt none-
theless that it had a significant deterrent value. 328 F.Supp. at 1086.
Uses of machines and scientific tests suggest privacy
and self-incrimination problems. In Katz v. UnitedStates, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Supreme Court re-
versed a conviction based on evidence introduced at
trial, which had been obtained with an electronic lis-
tening and recording device, on a right to privacy
theory. Compare Cox v. United States, 449 F.2d 679(10th Cir. 1971) (upholding the wiretap provisions ofTitle III of the Omnibus Crime Control and SafeStreets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20, with United
States v. Whittaker, - F. Supp. - (E.D. Pa. 1972)("Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), mayhave modified the Berger holding in some respects, but
we do not read it as giving approval to the lengthy
continuous searches which can be conducted pursuant
to Title II"). In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966), the Court upheld an involuntary with-
drawal of blood from a suspect but cautioned:
To compel a person to submit to testing in which
an effort will be made to determine his guilt or in-
nocence on the basis of physiological responses,
1972]
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more violators could be found as a result of "in-
articulate hunches" than through use of the
"scientific" system used by the airlines. The fact
that 94% of the people designated as weapon-car-
rying hijackers by the system turn out not to be
armed raises a serious doubt as to the system's
efficacy.
Without more details about the profile analysis
it is not possible for the defendant or the public
to be certain that the proper balance has been
struck between individual rights and public safety
under the current anti-hijacking system. Ap-
parently both must accept the court's independent
findings that the characteristics of the analysis are
not discriminatory in any way and that they bear a
substantial relation to actual, observable char-
acteristics of hijackers." Giving a description of
known hijackers in 24 specific cases one writer
noted:
With this refined intelligence, we can now pinpoint
your problem passenger. First, we can eliminate,
thus far, people under 16 or over 60. Using the
generic "he" the skyjacker is detailed as follows:
Age 16 to 60, Caucasian, Latin or (B)lack, male
or female, alone or in groups, with or without chil-
dren, generally of unobtrusive dress but occasion-
ally well or gaudily or poorly dressed, clean shaven
or bearded."
Although the Lopez court was persuaded that the
characteristics of the potential hijackers chosen for
the profile were well-calculated to eliminate safe
whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and his-
tory of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 764.
"328 F. Supp. at 1086. According to the court, the
task force analyzed known hijackers and compiled a
list of 25 to 30 characteristics in which they felt that
hijackers differed significantly from other airline pas-
sengers. They made up the profile by combining a few
of these characteristics. In testing a sample of 30 later
hijackers the task force found that 90% of them would
have met the profile. The characteristics in the profile
are continuously re-evaluated in light of new hijackings,
the court said.
65Toothman, Legal Problems of Skyjacking, 1969
ABA SEC. INs. N. & C.L. 251, 253-54 (1969). For an
extensive bibliography of materials on airplane hi-
jackings, see 26 RECoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 325,(1971).
See also Wurfel, Aircraft Piracy-Crime or Fun?, 10
Wm. & MaY L. REv. 820 (1969); Comment, Aircraft
Hijacking: Criminal and Civil Aspects, 22 U. FLA. L.
REv. 72 (1969). For a psychiatrist's view of what moti-
vates hijackers and how skyjacking might be deterred
see D. -HUBBARD, THE SKYJACKER-His FLIGHTS OF
FANCY (1971). For additional statistics and interna-
tional aspects of the hijacking problem see Hirsch &
Fuller, Aircraft Piracy and Extradition, 16 N.Y.L.F.
392 (1970); Panhuys, Aircraft Hijacking and Interna-
tional Law, 9 CoLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1970).
persons while isolating those likely to be danger-
ous86 this assumption is questionable in light of
known information about actual hijackers" and
also considering the fact that 14 out of 15 people
selected by this "scientific" system proved not to
be armed." Statistics such as those used by thi
court can be misleading.69 There is no indication of
how many people would be found carrying weapons
in a random street sampling. It is also not known
whether more people carrying weapons onto air-
planes could be picked out on the basis of
"hunches" which were specifically disallowed in
TerryY°
In addition to the problems inherent in the
Lopez court's balancing test there is an additional
flaw in its reliance on Terry's protective search
rationale. Stating that a United States Marshal
would be imprudent if he did not heed the warning
"given to him by the system," the Lopez court held
that a narrowly circumscribed protective weapons
"pat-down" is constitutionally permissible under
those circumstances?' The court did not mention
the fact that the Terry holding on which it reliedn
was strictly limited to a situation in which a police
officer personally observed unusual conduct which,
61328 F. Supp. at 1084.
67 See Toothman, supra note 65, at 252-53.
"328 F. Supp. at 1084.
"Many lawyers and judges have expressed appre-
hension about use of statistics and probability figures
in court determinations. People v. Collins; 68 Cal. 2d
319, 438 P.2d 33 (1968), points out specific problems in
attempting to apply mathematical and statistical
techniques to a legal issue. The court stated that in this
case there was an inadequate foundation for the sta-
tistical theory; also the theory distracted the jury from
its proper function of weighing the evidence and placed
both the jury and defense counsel at a disadvantage in
sifting relevant fact from inapplicable theory. See also
Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173 (E.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 437 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1970); State v. Coolidge, 109
N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547 (1969), rev'd on other grounds,
403 U.S. 443 (1971); Brown & Kelly, Playing the Per-
centages and the Law of Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 23
(1970); Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to
Identification Evidence, 83 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1970);
Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factflnding Frocess, 20
STANi. L. REv. 1065 (1968); Kingston, Probability and
Legal Proceedings, 57 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 93 (1966);
Kirk, The Use of Statistics in Criminalistics, 55 J. CRam.
L.C. & P.S. 514 (1964); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HAuv. L.
REv. 1329 (1971); Note, Evidence: Admission of Mathe-
matical Probability Statistics Held Erroneous for Want of
Demonstration of Validity, 1967 DUKE L.J. 665 (1967).
0 392 U.S. at 27.
71328 F. Supp. at 1097.
"The court stated:
Thus the only exception to the warrant rule under
which the search of this defendant can be justified
is the protective "frisk" for weapons authorized




in light of his experience, reasonably led him to be-
lieve that criminal conduct could be imminent and
that the persons involved might be armed and
dangerous. The court emphasized the statement in
Terry that a frisk could be justified on the ground
it was necessary "to protect himself and others
from possible danger," 71 to support its finding that
it is not "significant" that frisks are normally in-
tended to protect officers against assaults while
they are interviewing a suspect, while anti-hijack-
ing frisks take place after the preliminary ques-
tioning. The "others" mentioned in Terry referred
to bystander7 who might be injured during an in-
terrogation by a policeman and not to members of
society in general who might be injured in connec-
tion with some specific criminal activity of the sus-
pect. The fact that the search is not conducted un-
til after the initial period of interrogation takes
hijacking cases out of the realm of self-protective
frisks for weapons by police officers. The admission
that the search is for protection of passengers75
removes such cases one step further from the self-
protective weapons search sanctioned in Terry.
Although the' Terry analogy relied on by the
court is not satisfactory," another ground, rejected
71Id. at 1097 (emphasis in the original).
7 The sole justification of the search in the present
situation is the protection of the police officer
and others nearby....
392 U.S. at 29.
75328 F. Supp. at 1097. The search itself was con-
ducted in private, id. at 1082; thus the passengers were
not "bystanders" in the Terry sense. See note 74 supra.
76 In a later case, United States v. Epperson, 454
F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972), a passenger was stopped after
a magnetometer disclosed an unusually high reading.
A subsequent search yielded a gun. In upholding the
defendant's conviction the court said that use of a mag-
netometer in these circumstances was a "search" within
the meaning of the fourth amendment and did not fall
within any of the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement except that suggested by Terry v. Ohio.
The court stated that, although the Terry case con-
trolled, the reason in Terry for dispensing with the
usual warrant requirement was not the same as in the
case before it, but rather:
The danger is so well known, the governmental
interest so overwhelming, and the invasion of pri-
vacy so minimal, that the warrant requirement is
excused by exigent national circumstances.
Id. at 771. But see United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d
701 (3rd Cir. 1971), which relied on the "for protection
of himself and others" theory of Terry to uphold the
heroin conviction of an airline passenger who was dis-
discovered because he "appeared nervous." Admitting
that the level of suspicion in this case was lower than
in Terry, the court stated: "
In the context of a possible airplane hijacking with
the enormous consequences which may flow there-
from... the level of suspicion required for a Terry
investigative stop and protective search should be
lowered.
Id. at 703.
by the court, provides better justification for
allowing a weapons search of airline passengers.
This ground is implied consent to be searched.
The Lopez court rightly indicated that there is
generally a presumption against consent and it
cannot lightly be assumed that a suspect selected
by an anti-hijacking system has voluntarily agreed,
to be searched by the officer who is called to ques-
tion him. He might at that point believe that he
is under arrest and feel that he has little choice.
Nevertheless, there is one factor which lends
some weight to a theory of implied consent in such
cases. Conspicuous warnings are posted at board-
ing gates and elsewhere in airports warning pas-
sengers that "Carrying Concealed Weapons
Aboard Aircraft Is Punishable by Prison Sentences
& Fines" and "Passengers and Baggage Subject
to Search." 7 Though not furnishing adequate
warning that any other contraband might be
seized, these signs would dearly indicate to a per-
son carrying a weapon that he is committing an il-
legal act if he tries to board an airplane with it,
and he is given notice that he is subject to search
for such an article78 If after this warning he at-
tempts to board the airplane, he could be con-
sidered to have impliedly consented to the search by
this voluntary act of boarding. Therefore the con-
sent is given when he attempts to board and not at
the time he is being questioned by an officer.
RlGnr To TRAVEL
The Lopez court stated that the government
could not condition the defendant's constitutional
right to travel on the voluntary relinquishment of
his fourth amendment rights. 9 However, no one
could argue that the right to travel of anyone, at
any time, in any manner and by any means is ab-
solute. Though unwilling to infer consent, the court
was willing to interfere with this right to travel on
the questionable basis of the Terry rationale. Ac-
cording to the court anyone designated-as a "se-
lectee" by the anti-hijacking system could be
denied boarding"0 and furthermore could be de-
77 See Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1083, 1092.
78 According to newpaper reports these signs appear
to have a definite deterrent effect. Airline security men
and U.S. Marshals have reported finding guns and
other weapons stashed among potted palms and else-
where in airport terminals, apparently put there to
avoid detection at boarding gates. Wall Street Journal,
Sept. 21, 1971, at 1; Chicago Tribune, Dec. 5, 1971,
§10, at 6, col. 1.79 See note 49 supra.
80 328 F. Supp. at 1083.
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tained even if he decided at that point not to board
the airplane.8
Persons entering the United States are subject
to search at its borders.82 Implied consent statutes
for drunken drivers have been enacted in all 50
states and have consistently been upheld, even
though they restrict travel. In passport cases
courts have held that restrictions on travel were
justified by considerations of national security.8
Because of the danger element involved, the pass-
port cases are more analogous to hijacking cases
than others such as Shapiro v. Thompson, 5 a case
related to a right to reside in a particular place
rather than a specific right involving the process of
traveling from one place to another. This is not to
indicate that the right involved in actual traveling
81 Id. at 1093. The court noted testimony of two
Marshals that the defendant was not free to go at any
time after they began interviewing him, to support its
view that "consent" given by a defendant could not be
vitiated by a reversal of his decision to board the air-
plane. See also United States v. Brown, 305 F. Supp.
415, 417-18 (1969), in which the defendant's motion
for acquittal on grounds that his acts did not constitute
an attempt to board an aircraft was rejected by the
court even though he had not yet started to board the
airplane. The court held that the surrendering of his
ticket at the customer service agent's desk and his sub-
sequent entry into the departure lounge for the flight
covered by that ticket constituted an attempt to board
the aircraft. The offense, attempt to board an aircraft
with a concealed weapon, had already been committed
and he was not free at that time to change his mind
and leave the boarding area. See generally Fed. Av.
Act of 1958 § 902(1), 49 U.S.C. § 1472(t) (1970).
B2See United States v. Avey, 428 F.2d 1159 (9th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Miranda 426 F.2d 283
(9th Cir. 1970); 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1970); 19 U.S.C.§§ 1581, 1582 (1970). See also Note, Border Searches and
the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L. J. 1007 (1968).
m These statutes furnish a precedent for extending
implied consent to an area involving the constitutional
right to travel. A driver is assumed to have consented
to a test to determine the amount of alcohol he has
consumed as a condition of holding a driver's license.
If a driver refuses to submit to such a test his driver's
license may be revoked or suspended. This practice has
been held constitutional. See Fallis v. Dept. of Motor
Vehicles, 264 Cal. App. 2d 373, 70 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1968);
Prucha v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110
N.W.2d 75 (1961); Anderson v. Macduff, 208 Misc. 271,
143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1955); Walton v. City of Roanoke,
204 Va. 678, 133 S.E.2d 315 (1963).
84 In denying the appellant's request for validation
of his passport for travel to Cuba the Court in Zemel
v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) stated:
[Tihe fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited with-
out due process of law does not mean that it can
under no circumstances be inhibited. The require-
ments of due process are a function not only of the
extent of the governmental restriction imposed,
but also of the extent of the necessity for the re-
striction.
Id. at 14.
85 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
is not also fundamental,"8 but the passport cases
clearly indicate that there are circumstances which
may justify restrictions. In Zemel v. Rusk 7 the
Court approved the Secretary of State's conclusion
that travel to Cuba by an American citizen might
involve the United States in a dangerous interna-
tional incident and therefore validation of his pass-
port for such travel was properly refused8 8 The
Court distinguished cases such as Kent v. Dulles5
and Apthecker v. Secretary of Stale,90 where restric-
tions on right to travel were struck down. In those
cases the issue was whether a citizen could be
denied a passport because of his political beliefs
or associations while in Zemel the restriction was
based on foreign policy considerations which af-
fected all citizens.
The Zemel reasoning is applicable to hijacking
cases. Under the system now required by the
government all persons are subject to some kind of
initial screening. 9' The rationale for the screening
and consequent searches is related to foreign policy
considerations as well as concern for public safety.
There is clearly a legitimate governmental interest
in preventing diversions of airplanes which could
develop into conflicts with other nations.
CONCLUSION
Since it is a federal crime to carry a concealed
weapon aboard an aircraft92 and the governmental
86 In United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), the
Court stated:
The constitutional right to travel from one state to
another, and necessarily to use the highways and
other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in
doing so, occupies a position fundamental to the
concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has
been firmly established and repeatedly recognized.
Id. at 757.
1 See 381 U.S. 1 (1965).8 8 The Court cited precedents for upholding such a
restriction on travel. Beginning in 1914 and continuing
through World War I passports were validated only
for specific purposes and specific countries. Area re-
strictions have also been imposed on numerous occa-
sions since World War II. Id. at 8-10.
89 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
80 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
91 A new federal rule went into effect in February,
1972, requiring some kind of screening of all airline
passengers. The Federal Aviation administration rule
requires that airline personnel or federal employees
screen every passenger at boarding time by using at
least one of four methods-magnetometer, behavioral
profile, demand for identification or search. Additional
federal anti-hijacking regulations were announced
March 11, 1972 by Transportation Secretary John
Volpe, but according to newspaper reports these re-
quirements have largely been ignored by airlines. See
Chicago Today, April 19, 1972, at 18 col. 1; Wall
Street Journal, April 19, 1972 at 9, col. 2.
92 Fed. Av. Act of 1958 § 902(1), 49 U.S.C. § 1472(l)
(1970). See note 81 supra.
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interest in upholding this law is substantial, there
should be some means of enforcing it in order to
accomplish the objective which it was designed to
meet. The best way of meeting this problem would
be to add a provision to the statute itself, similar
to provisions found in implied consent-drunken
driving statute, that all air passengers are subject
to search for weapons before boarding. This should
be upheld on the basis of a compelling govern-
mental interest in national security and the safety
of its citizens. Also, a new rule should be formu-
lated, analogous to the state and military secrets
provision9 3 to allow the type of in camera testi-
mony which Lopez employed. The rationales for
the present exceptions for exclusion are not close
enough to be applicable to hijacking cases, but
could serve as precedent for formulation of a new
rationale based on requirements of public safety.
The situation might best be dealt with by enact-
ment of a statute requiring non-disclosure of pro-
file information.4 Since the danger is so great and
the usefulness of the system would be destroyed if
its contents were revealed, such a rule should be
upheld.
In both the exclusion from the courtroom and
the implied consent to be searched, the only legiti-
mate governmental interest in the use of the anti-
hijacking system relates to searches for weapons
carried by potential hijackers. 95 It is the general
position of the law that when a search for a particu-
lar object is legitimate, any other evidence of a
crime discovered in the process of a reasonable
search is admissible at trial." However, the cir-
See note 37 supra.
94See 8 WiGuotE § 2378(3) (a).
95 In United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771
(4th Cir. 1972), the court said:
We think the search for the sole purpose of dis-
covering weapons and preventing air piracy, and
not for the purpose of discovering weapons and pre-
criminal events, fully-justified the minimal invasion
of personal privacy by [the] magnetometer.
"If entry upon the premises be authorized and the
search which follows be valid, there is nothing in
the Fourth Amendment which inhibits the seizure
by law-enforcement agents of government prop-
erty the possesion of which is a crime, even though
the officers are not aware that such property is on
the premises when the search is initiated.
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947),
overruled on oilier grounds, Chimel v. California, 395
cumstances of anti-hi.acking searches are unusual.
In these cases there is no probable or reasonable
cause to search other than a system of questionable
reliability. A significant problem of the anti-hijack-
ing system is its lack of selectivity; it tends to se-
lect law violators in general and not just hijackers9
There are many possibilities for abuse of this sys-
tem9" and, as Lopez indicates, it is not always possi-
ble to tell when the system is changed or
abused.9
Even if the contents of the profile were known,
it would be difficult for the defendant and the
public to be certain that the proper procedure had
been followed in applying it. It is only because of
the great counter-balancing danger from armed
hijackers that such a system could be upheld.
Therefore the unusual circumstances justify a
different approach to the law.
In order to protect the public and yet also avoid
the chances for mistake, discrimination,*and abuse
of the system, it should be the rule that any evi-
dence of illegal activity other than weapons will
not be admissible in court. Under this rule there
will be no incentive for the government, or for
prejudiced or overzealous airline employees, to try
to catch other violators, for which there is not
constitutional justification in such a situation; but
the air traveling public wil stil have the protection
of the system against the only danger that it is con-
cerned with-potential hijackings.
U.S. 752 (1969). See LaFave, "Street Encounters" and
the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67
MicH. L. REv. 40 (1968) Cf. Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40 (1968). Analogous to this situation, it has been
held that if an officer sees something in plain view it
may be seized as evidence. Harris v. United States, 390
U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
1 See note 3 supra.
"See note 35 supra.
"It appears from the opinion that the court could
not tell whether the airline personnel were operating
under the government-approved profile or under the
"updated" profile issued by an airline employee. Noting
that neither the government nor Pan American could
assure the court that the airline employees at the
boarding gate had not read the employee's memoran-
dum, the court concluded:
Under the circumstances, the Court must assume
that the "updated" profile was, in fact, employed
in selecting the defendant.
328 F. Supp. at 1101. Based on this information it ap-
pears that the defendant could have fit the original
profile, as well as the revised one.
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CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THE REFUSE ACT OF 1899 AND
THE REFUSE ACT PERMIT PROGRAM
The Refuse Act of 18991 imposes criminal lia-
bility for the discharge of refuse into any navigable
water if the discharge is not sanctioned by a permit
granted by the Secretary of the Army. Executive
Order 11,5742 establishes a program in which the
Secretary of the Army, in conjunction with the En-
vironmental Protection Agency issues permits for
industrial discharges into navigable waters under
Section 407 of the Refuse Act.3 The purpose of this
permit program is to incorporate the Refuse Act
into more recently enacted Federal water quality
legislation, specifically the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act.4 This comment will examine the
imposition of criminal liability for water pollution
under the Refuse Act of 1899, the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), and the Refuse
Act Permit Program.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THE REFUSE ACT
OF 1899
The Refuse Act consists of sections 407, 411 and
413 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. 5 Section
407 of the Act prohibits both discharging refuse
matter into any navigable water or tributary of a
navigable water or depositing material on the bank
of any navigable water where it can be washed into
the water. 6 Two exceptions to the blanket prohibi-
133 U.S.C. §§ 407, 408, 411, 413 (1970).
Exec. Order No. 11,574, 3 C.F.R. 188 (1970).
3 Although the Refuse Act was passed in 1899, the
Army Corps of Engineers had never issued a permit
under Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. 33
U.S.C. § 407 (1964). The Section 13 permit is not to be
confused with permits issued under Section 10 of the
Act. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964). Section 10 permits regu-
late only the construction of wharves and the deposi-
tion of materials which might obstruct navigation
without regard to the polluting characteristics of the
proposed discharge. As of June, 1971, approximately
100,000 Section 10 permits were in effect. Hearings be-
fore the Senate Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution
of the Comm. of Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at
4297 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Senate Hearings].
4 33 U.S.C. § 1151 et seq. (1970).533 U.S.C. §§ 401-13 (1964).
6 33 U.S.C. 407 (1964) makes it unlawful:
[T]o throw, discharge, or deposit... either from
or out of any ship, barge or other floating craft of
any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing
establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse
matter of any kind or description whatever other
than that flowing from streets and sewers and
passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navi-
gable water of the United States, or into any tribu-
tion are refuse "flowing from streets and sewers
and passing therefrom in a liquid state" and any
discharge made according to the terms of a permit
issued by the Secretary of the Army through the
Corps of Engineers.
7
Section 411 of the Refuse Act fixes penalties for
violations of Section 407 by a fine of $500 to $2500
or imprisonment for 30 days to a year.8 This section
also provides that the court order the payment of
one-half of the fine levied to any person giving in-
formation leading to a conviction under Section
407.9 Section 413 places upon the Department of
Justice the duty to "vigorously prosecute all offend-
ers" at the request of Army or other designated
officials. 10
Despite a limited legislative history which in-
dicates that the Congress did not consider the
Refuse Act to be anti-pollution legislation,"' courts
tary of any navigable water from which the same
shall float or be washed into such navigable water
... provided... [tihat the Secretary of the Army,
whenever in the judgment of the Chief of Engi-
neers anchorage and navigation will not be injured
thereby, may permit the deposit of any material
above mentioned in navigable waters, within limits
to be defined and under conditions to be prescribed
by him, provided application is made to him prior
to depositing such material ....
7Id.
8 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
9 Courts have held that the award to an informer of
one-half of the fine assessed in a criminal proceeding
is mandatory under the Refuse Act. See, e.g., United
States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 328 F. Supp. 660, (W.D.
Wisc. 1971), United States v. Transit-Mix Concrete
Corp., 2 BNA ENVIRON. REP. 1074 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
However, seven federal district courts have ruled that
Section 411 of the Refuse Act will not sustain a civil suit
brought by a private citizen or public interest group
against either the violator or the appropriate agency
to secure enforcement of Section 407. In each instance,
the court denied citizen standing on the grounds that a
civil suit to enforce a criminal statute not expressly
authorized on the face of the statute is invalid. Thus a
qui tam action under the Refuse Act will probably not
be successful. Bass Angler Sportsman Soc'y v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Ala. 1971); Ruess
v. Moss-American Inc., 323 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Wis.
1971); Bass Angler Sportsman Soc'y v. Plywood-
Champion Papers Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302 (S.D. Tex.
1971); Matthews v. Florida Vanderbilt Corp., 326 F.
Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla. 1971); United States ex rel. Matt-
son v. Northwest Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 347 (D. Neb.
1971); Durning v. ITT Rayonier, 325 F. Supp. 446
(W.D. Wash. 1970).
10 33 U.S.C. § 413 (1964).'11The Refuse Act of 1899 is a codification of Section
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have consistently held that the discharge of in-
dustrial waste without a permit is a criminal offense
under Section 407 of the Refuse Act regardless of
the intent or knowledge of the discharger. 2 In
United Slates v. Republic Steel Corporation,3 the
Supreme Court recognized that the purpose behind
the Act was not only to prohibit discharges causing
impediments to navigation but also to outlaw the
discharge of all refuse matter. The Court stated
that the Refuse Act must be read "charitably"
in order to serve the purpose of protecting the
nation's water resources. 4 In United States v.
6 of the 1890 Rivers and Harbors Act, 27 Stat. 453,
and the 1894 Rivers and Harbors Act, 28 Stat. 363.
Both the language and the legislative history of those
Acts indicate that they were intended to prohibit only
those discharges which physically impaired the naviga-
bility of waterways. See 21 CONG. REc. 1318 (1890);
26 CONG. REc. 4348 (1894); 21 Op. Arr'Y. GEN. 305
(1896). The 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act was passed
in response to both a direction in the 1896 Rivers and
Harbors Act that all general laws for the preservation
of navigable waters be compiled and the Supreme
Court's decision that the Federal government had no
common law authority over navigable waters in Willa-
mette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888). At
the time of its enactment, the Army Corps of Engineers
(the formulators of the 1899 compilation of the 1890
and 1894 Acts), the bill's sponsor in the Senate, and the
House Conference Report on the Act, all stated that
the 1899 Act contained no essential changes in the
existing laws. See H. R. Doc. No. 293, 54th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1899); 32 CONG. REc. 2296 (1899); 32 CONG.
REc. 2923 (1899). Thus while the Congress intended to
allow the Act to have broad applicability in protecting
navigability, there is no indication that it intended the
1899 Act to cover pollution that did not obstruct or
impede navigation. See Druley, The Refuse Act of 1899,
3 BNA ENVIRoN. REP., MONO. 11 (1972) 28 [herein-
after cited as Druley]; Hearings on Water Pollution
Control Legislation on Oversight of Existing Program
Before the House Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 262, 288, 305-6 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as 1971 House Hearings].
12 Strict criminal liability is imposed since no element
of scienter has been implied in the Refuse Act. See, e.g.,
United States v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 375 F.2d 621
(3d Cir. 1967); United States v. Getty Oil Co., 3 BNA
ENVIRON. REP. 1225 (S.D. Tex. 1971); United States v.
Humble Oil Co., 3 BNA ENVIRON. REP. 1226 (S.D.
Tex. 1971); United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 328 F.
Supp. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1970); United States v. Interlake
Steel Corp., 297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1969) -(dis-
charge of iron and oily particles into river is an offense,
regardless of intent).
362 U.S. 482 (1960). The discharge of inorganic
solids into the Calumet River violated Section 407 of
the Refuse Act in that it both created an obstruction
to navigation and constituted refuse. The Court re-jected a narrow reading of the Act in order to best serve
the Act's purpose of protecting the nation's waterways.
The Court stated, id. at 491:
We read the 1899 Act charitably in light of the
purpose to be served. The philosophy of the state-
ment of Mr. Justice Holmes in New Jersey v. New
York, 283 U.S. 336, 342, that "a river is more
than an amenity, it is a treasure," forbids a narrow
cramped reading....
Standard Oil Company,5 the Court broadly defined
refuse matter as "anything which has become waste
including foreign substances and pollutants."'16
Consequently, discharges of commercially valuable
oil, 17 organic settleable solids, 8 cyanides, phenols,
sulfides, and ammonia, 19 and heated water" have
been held to violate Section 407 of the Act. Thus
the Refuse Act as interpreted by the courts es-
tablishes a simple standard: discharge of anything
into navigable water without a permit constitutes
a Federal criminal offense.
Violations of Section 407 of the Refuse Act are
punishable by fines and imprisonment." Each act
of discharging refuse constitutes a separate viola-
tion of the Act." Although no decision supports the
idea directly, it is generally believed that each day
of a continuous discharge constitutes a separate
violation.23 In two instances, the court in the South-
ern District of New York has imposed cumulative
fines for continuous discharges. In United States v.
Standard Brands, Inc.,4 the court decided that the
use of multiple counts was the only means of dis-
tinguishing long-term, continuous dischargers from
occasional polluters and assessed a fine of $125,000
for violations which occurred over a two year pe-
riod. The same court later fined another violator
$200,000.2 These two assessments represent the
largest fines levied under the Refuse Act.
In addition to criminal fines, the Act provides
for the imprisonment of individuals responsible for
the violation. 26 In the past, courts have been re-
15384 U.S. 224 (1966).
16 Id. at 227.
"7Id See e g United States v. Esso Standard Oil Co.,
375 F.2d 62i ?3d Cir. 1967); La Merced, 84 F.2d 444
(9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Ballard Oil Co., 195
F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1962).
11 United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S.
482 (1960).
19 United States v. Armco Steel Co., 333 F. Supp.
1033 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
20 United States v. Florida Power and Light Co., 53
F.R.D. 249 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
21 See note 8 supra.
" United States v. S.S. Mormacsaga, 204 F. Supp.
701 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (three discharges made by a shlp
at different geographical points and at different times
constituted three separate violations of the Act).
"See Note, The Refuse Act, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 304,
313 (1971). Several state water pollution statutes
which parallel the Refuse Act in other respects state
specifically that each day upon which a violation occurs
constitutes a separate offense. See N.Y. Pu. HkAL zE
LAw § 1252 (Supp. 1970-71); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit.
82 § 937(b) (1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 9181(Supp.
190); CouxciL or STATE GOVERN ENTS, 1971 Suo-
GESTED STATE LE GiSLATiON § 10(b) (1970).
' 
4 No. 70 Cr. 858 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 7, 1970).
" United States v. Anaconda Wire and Cable Co.,
No. 71 Cr. 1028 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 12, 1971).
" See note 8 supra.
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luctant to hold corporate officials personally liable
and either fine or jail them for the Refuse Act
violations caused by their corporations. Recently
the president of a corporation was fined $1500 and
three other individuals have been indicted in sep-
arate instances for the Refuse Act violations of
their companies.Y
While criminal sanctions have on occasion been
utilized in the enforcement of anti-trust laws,
2
8
rent and housing controls, 9 and local housing code
ordinances, 30 the imposition of criminal liability
under the Refuse Act is a new aspect to the enforce-
ment of water pollution control legislation. As in
all criminal prosecution, the purpose of imposing
criminal sanctions is to deter the potential violator
by threatening him with the public stigma of
criminal prosecution and the imposition of criminal
penalties." In general, the imposition of criminal
2 On October 27, 1971, J. J. O'Donnell, President of
Woolens, Inc., of South Grafton, Massachusetts, be-
came the first individual to be fined for his company's
violation of the Refuse Act when a Massachusetts Dis-
trict Court fined both him and the corporation the
maximum amount. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1971, at 1,
col. 6; 1 BNA ENVIRON. REP. 850, CURRENT DEVs.
(1971). At present, the head of a Baltimore car wash,
the president of a ceramics concern, and the manager
of United States Steel Corporation's South Works in
Chicago are under indictment for aiding and abetting
illegal discharge into navigable waters. James P. Byrne,
President of Baltimore Imported Car Service and
Storage, Inc., was indicted on 100 counts of pumping
solvents and petroleum residue into a tributary of
Chesapeake Bay. Edward L. Bauman, head of Bettinger
Corporation, was indicted on 5 counts of dumping clay-
like sludge into the Charles River in Massachusetts.
Charles M. Kay, U.S. Steel South Works, faces charges
stemming from the discharge of iron oxides and solid
waste into Lake Michigan. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1971,
at 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1971, at 3, col. 2.
United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 3 BNA ENVIRON.
REP. 1037 (N.D. I1. 1971).
2 See, e.g., United States v. McDonough Co., 180
F. Supp. 511 (S.D. Ohio 1959) where the president and
three vice presidents of several garden tool manufac-
turing firms received ninety day jail sentences for
violations of the Sherman Act and United States v.
Westinghouse Elect. Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 76753
(E.D. Pa.) where corporate executives received in
addition to fines and probation, seven sentences to
imprisonment for 30 days for price-fixing activities. For
a discussion of the Westinghouse case, see Watkins,
Electrical Equipment Anti-Trust Cases-Their Implica-
tions for Government and Business, 29 U. Cni. L. REv.
97 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Watkins].
" See Ball, Social Structure and Rent Control Viola-
lions, 65 Am. J. SOCIOLOoY 598 (1968).
" Grad, The Sanction in Housing Code Enforcement:
Implications for the Enforcement of Environmental
Regulation in the Urban Environment, ENViRONSmENTAL
LAW 7-21 (F. Grad ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
Grad, Implications].
11 Ball & Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions
in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Socio-
liability place a moral stigma on the act proscribed
and serves to warn and deter further transgressions
by its penalties.12 The Refuse Act attaches the
stigma of criminality to pollution- and establishes
sanctions to deter it.
There is evidence to suggest that the practical
deterrent value of enforcing water pollution laws
like other economic regulations9 with criminal
penalties alone, is minimal. In the case of the Re-
fuse Act, nearly every industry in the country is
presently in violation of the Act. 9 Consequently
there is no great public stigma attached to violating
the Act.35 Pollution has, until recently, been viewed
as morally neutral, if not blameless by society in
general . 6 Further, the maximum fine possible
under the Refuse Act is far less than the cost of
installing necessary abatement facilities and alter-
ing a plant's production system to eliminate efflu-
ent discharges.' The threat of individual responsi-
bility including fines and jail sentences is diluted
by the practical difficulties of proof of individual
liability within the corporate structure.38 Neither
logical View, 17 STAN. L. REv. 197, 216 (1965) [herein-
after cited as Ball & Friedman].
2Ball & Friedman suggest that threatening the
businessman with criminal liability for violations of
economic regulations provides a strong deterrent since
the ideology of the business ethic abhors the idea of
being branded a criminal. Id. at 217.
-1 On the utility of enforcing violations of regulatory
and economic ordinances with criminal sanctions in
price-fixing cases, compare Kadish, Some Observations
on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic
Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 433 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Kadish], with Ball & Friedman.
-4 See 1971 Senate Hearings at 4340.
SGrad, Implications at 7-32. The concept of "moral
neutrality" is analyzed in both Ball & Friedman and
Kadish.
16 Grad, Implications at 7-29.
37 Pollution abatement facilities are not inexpensive.
For instance, in the paper industry the capital costs of
abatement facilities for new mills average two to four
percent of the total capital investment. Yearly costs of
operating the facilities approximates fifteen percent of
the original capital cost for the average installation.
For highly sophisticated installations this cost may
approach thirty percent. Billings & DeHaas, Pollution
Control in the Pulp and Paper Industry, POLLUTION
CONTROL HANDBOOK 18-17 (Lund ed. 1971) [herein-
after cited as POLLUTION CONTROL HANDBOOK].
Is See, e.g., Watkins, discussing practical problems
of proof in the Electrical Equipment Cases where top
management claimed ignorance of decisions made by
middle-management and middle-management alleged
that it only followed orders from above. The anti-trust
cases indicate that even when there has been strong
proof that the accused executives participated in some
meaningful way in price-fixing activities, juries have
preferred to convict the corporation and acquit the
individual defendants. See Note, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 292
n.50 (1961); Whiting, Antitrust and the Corporate Ex-
ecutive, 47 VA. L. Rav. 929 (1961); Kadish.
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the moral stigma of being branded a criminal vio-
lator of the Refuse Act nor the actual penalties
imposed have much deterrent value.39
The Supreme Court, in Wyandotte Transporta-
lion Co. v. United States,4" recognized that the crimi-
nal penalties of the Refuse Act alone may provide
insufficient deterrence and held that injunctive
relief is both appropriate and necessary to insure
the full effectiveness of the statute. So interpreted,
the Refuse Act empowers the court to order the
clean-up of past discharges" and the immediate
cessation of all present and future violations." This
injunctive power allows the court to deal with
major industrial polluters by depriving the violator
of the economic advantage of his business until
his compliance is obtained."
While the anti-trust cases and Housing Code
experiences indicate that the criminal penalties of
the Refuse Act may be too insignificant to provide
more than a modest degree of deterrence, the Act
does attach the stigma of criminality to behavior
once generally considered a right of industry. Most
important, the Refuse Act provides the legal basis
for the comprehensive, immediate abatement of all
water pollution from industrial sources through
injunctive relief. The existence of the right to in-
junctive relief under the Act prevents the dismissal
of Refuse Act penalties as trivial.
Despite repeated court rulings" and a statutory
pronouncement that the Refuse Act is not im-
So The enforcement of Housing Code violations with
criminal penalties in New York City suggests that the
combination of insignificant fines, the remote possibility
of individual liability, and the seeming moral neutrality
of an economic regulation like Housing Codes leads to
a trivialization of the offense by the courts thus nullify-
ing the deterrent value of criminal sanctions. Of 40,000
yearly prosecutions the average fine was less than $13.
The average fine per count or per code violation was
less than one dollar. Grad, Implications at 7-25.
40 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
41 Id.
"In United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362
U.S. 482 (1960), the Court enjoined the discharge of
industrial solids into the Calumet River. In United
States v. Armco Steel Co., 333 F. Supp. 1033, (S.D.
Tex. 1971) the court stopped the discharge of cyanides,
phenols, sulfides, ammonia and other toxic pollutants
into the Houston Ship Canal.
43 F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 7-33 (1971). See
generally, Note, Injunctions, 78 HAxv. L. _Rv." 994
(1965).
"See, e.g., United States v. Maplewood Poultry, 327
F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Me. 1971); United States v. Hum-
ble Oil Co., 3 BNA ENvIRoN. REP. 1226 (S.D. Tex.
1971); United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 3 BNA EN-
v RoN. REP. 1057 (N.D. Ill. 1971); United States v.
U.S. Steel Corp., 328 F.Supp. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1970);
United States v. Vulcan Materials Co., 329 F. Supp.
339 (D. N.J. 1970); United States v. Interlake Steel
Corp., 297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
paired or superseded by subsequent water pollution
control legislation 4 and the demonstrated effec-
tiveness of the Act in controlling pollution,4 6 the
Justice Department has not consistently enforced
the Act against continuous dischargers. The De-
partment has used the Act only in cases of infre-
quent occurrence like oil spills or as a last resort
when other state and Federal procedures have
failed.47 The policy of the Justice Department has
been to defer action under the Refuse Act, pro-
ceeding instead under the more recently enacted
Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 4"
THE FEDERAL WATER PoLLuTIoN CoNTROL
AcT
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA)49 establishes an alternative legislative
scheme to control water pollution. Unlike the Re-
fuse Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
does not impose criminal liability but rather op-
erates through the civil enforcement of state-
created water quality standards. The Federal Wa-
ter Quality Act of 1965,10 an amendment to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, requires the
creation of water quality standards by the states
subject to approval by the administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 51 In
formulating standards, the states were required to
enhance the quality of water while taking into ac-
count the projected use of the waterway. 2 To
11 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act explicitly
rejects the contention that it has superseded the Refuse
Act. The FWPCA, at 33 U.S.C. § 1174 (1970) provides:
This chapter shall not be construed as ... affect-
ing or impairing the provisions of sections 407, 408,
409, and 411 to 413 of this title [the provisions of
the Refuse Act]....
46 In 1970, enforcement of the Refuse Act resulted
in sizeable reductions in the amount of mercury dis-
charged and helped relieve the mercury crisis. See
Hearings on Mercury Pollution and Enforcement under
the Refuse Act Before the Subcomm. on Conservation and
Natural Resources, and the Environment of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce,-92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 424-
442, 46-71 (1971).
"See, e.g., Burch, Environmental Pollution Control
Law in Pennsylvania: A Survey and Analysis, 16 VIrL.
L. R v. 815, 824 (1970); Comment, Federal Pollution
Control, 16 Vsu.. L. REv. 827, 846 (1970); N.Y. Times,
Nov. 5, 1971, at 1, col. 6; 1971 House Hearings at 262.
"8 See Druley at 5-8.
433 U.S.C. § 1151 et seq. (1970).
50 33 U.S.C. § 466 (1964) et seq., as amended 33
U.S.C. § 1151 et seq. (1970).6133 U.S.C. § 1160(c) (1970).
5233 U.S.C. § 1160(c) (3) (1970). Specified water
uses include "public water supplies, propagation of
fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, agricultural,
industrial and other legitimate uses." The strictness of
the criteria established depends on the projected use.
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date, all fifty states have established water quality
standards and have accompanying implementation
plans but only 27 have been completely approved
by the EPA Administrator.5
The discharge of any substance which reduces
the quality of the waters below the state water
quality standards governing that waterway con-
stitutes a violation and is subject to FWPCA en-
enforcement proceedings 4 The FWPCA enforce-
ment procedure begins with a conference between
federal and state agencies concerning a possible
violation. 55 Based on the results of the conference,
the EPA can then recommend that the state agency
take action designed to secure abatement of the
violation. The state has at least six months to re-
spond.56 If the state fails to act, the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency must call
a public hearing at which all parties are entitled to
testify. The Federal Hearing Board must make
factual findings and recommend that the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency
take appropriate action to secure abatement.57
The Administrator then sends the findings of the
Hearing Board to the offending person or company
together with a notice specifying a reasonable time
of not less than six months in which to comply.'
If the violator still refuses to comply with the
Hearing Board's recommendations, the Adminis-
trator may request that the Attorney General
bring suit to secure abatement where the discharge
has an inter-state impact.59 At least 180 days must
elapse between the Administrator's initial noti-
fication to the violator and a request for the At-
torney General to begin court action.6 1 When the
case is finally litigated, the court has wide dis-
cretion. It reviews the factual question of whether
the defendant discharged in violation of applicable
standards and it considers the "practicality and
physical and economic feasibility of complying
1
3 As of June 17, 1971, twenty states and five terri-
tories had fully approved water quality standards. The
standards of three states were pending EPA approval
and twenty other proposed standards were under nego-
tiation with no substantive problems reported. 1971
House Hearings, at 554.
33 U.S.C. § 1160(c) (5) (1970).
533 U.S.C. § 1160(d) (1) (1970).
5633 U.S.C. § 1160(e) (1970).
33 U.S.C. § 1160(f) (1) (1970).
55ld.
5933 U.S.C. § 1160(g) (1) (1970). If an intra-state
discharge endangers the health and welfare of individ-
uals within a state, the EPA must secure the written
consent of the Governor of the state in which the dis-
charge occurs before requesting the Attorney General
to sue.
6033 U.S.C. § 1160(c) (5) (1970).
with such standards." 61 The court can refuse to
enforce an EPA abatement order if it decides that
the cost of compliance to the company is too great.
Thus there exists two different legislatively
created standards regulating water pollution. Un-
der the Refuse Act, any discharge without a permit
is a criminal offense subject to immediate Federal
prosecution. However, the FWPCA-state stand-
ards specify that only discharges of certain sub-
stances at levels greater than the standards al-
lowed are violations. These violations are subject
to drawn-out proceedings and only a remote chance
of judicial enforcement. 2
THE REFUSE AcT PEIRT PROGRAu
The existence of two standards creates a dilemma
for dischargers.Y Since the Refuse Act is not super-
seded by FW'PCA-legislation,64 an industry may
be officially in compliance with FWPCA water
quality standards and still be liable for criminal
prosecution under the Refuse Act. Further, an
industry desiring to comply with the Refuse Act
was unable to secure a permit before President
Nixon created the Refuse Act Permit Program
on December 23, 1970 since no procedure existed
for their issuance.65 The Executive Order seeks
to resolve the conflict between the two standards
by making the issuance of a Refuse Act permit
contingent upon compliance with FWPCA water
quality standards.66 Thus if a discharger meets
FWPCA standards, he will be granted a permit
and will have satisfied both statutory requirements
and be exempt from all criminal liability.
According to the Executive Order, the Secretary
of the Army is responsible for granting or denying
permit applications.6 The Secretary must base
his decision on four factors: (1) compliance with
61 Id.
6 The remoteness of court action is emphasized by
the fact that as of 1970, only one court proceeding had
been instituted under the FWPCA for violation of
water quality standards. 3 NAT. Rxs. L.J. 41, 46 (1970).
63 The existence of the two standards had been held
not to create a situation which is unconstitutionally
vague. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 328
F.Supp. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1970).6 4See notes 44-45 supra.65 Exec. Order No. 11,574, 3 C.F.R. 188 (1970).
"
6Section 21(b) (1) of the Water Quality Improve-
ment Act of 1970, an amendment to the FWPCA, re-
quires that applicants for federal permits obtain certifi-
cation by state water pollution control agencies that
there is reasonable assurance that state water quality
standards will not be violated. 33 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (1)
(1970).
6T Exec. Order No. 11,574, § 2(a) (2), 3 C.F.R. 188
(1970).
[Vol. 63
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR WATER POLLUTION
appropriate water quality standards; m (2) the
effects on fish and wildlife not reflected in water
quality considerations;89 (3) environmental con-
siderations required by the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969;7 and (4) additional
factors prescribed by the Refuse Act or other perti-
nent lawsY'
With regard to judging compliance with ap-
plicable water quality standards and related con-
siderations, the Order directs that the Secretary
of the Army shall accept the findings of the Ad-
ministrator of the EPA. 2 The Order further directs
that if a state agency denies the certification re-
quired by Section 21(b) of the FWPCA, the permit
application must be denied. In that case, the EPA
must recommend denial and the Secretary must
accept this recommendation. 3 If the state agency
certifies that the proposed discharge will not vio-
late water quality standards, the position of the
EPA, as well as the Army Corps of Engineers is
to give considerable, although not conclusive,
weight to that findingY4 The EPA recognizes that
both the Executive Order and the FWPCA place
primary responsibility for preventing and con-
trolling water pollution on the states.7' Hence
the EPA will not likely override a state certifica-
tion unless it is clear that the proposed discharge
will fail to meet water quality standards or would
Old. § 2(2) (A).61 Id. § 2(3).
70Id. § 2(4).71 d. § 2 (2) (B).
72 Id. § 2(a) (2) (A); Army Corps of Engineers
Regulations, 333 C.F.R. 209.131 (d) (7) (1971). If the
EPA Regional Representative finds that a proposed
discharge will not violate water quality standards or
that a permit can be conditioned so as to ensure com-
pliance with the appropriate standards, the Army Corps
of Engineers District Engineer must accept his findings
and include the conditions recommended in any permit
issued. Id. (d) (8). Should the District Engineer and
EPA Regional Representative disagree over the appli-
cant's compliance with water quality standards or
related considerations, the matter must be forwarded
to the Secretary of the Army for consultation with the
EPA Administrator. The Secretary must accept the
Administrator's findings as to water quality standards
and considerations and must give careful consideration
to any recommendations the Administrator may make
before returning the case to the District Engineer with
instructions as to its disposition. Id. (d) (10).
3 C.F.R. 188 § 2(a) (2) (A) (1970). Environmental
Protection Agency, Policy Statements on the Process-
ing of Applications for Refuse Act Permits, § I C(1), 2
BNA ENviRoN. REP., CURRENT Dsv. 535 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as 1971 EPA Policy Statement].
71 Army Corps of Engineers Regulations, 333 C.F.R.
201.131 (d) (7) (1971); 1971 EPA Policy Statement§ I A (2).75Id. § I A (1).
be inconsistent with the EPA's interpretation of
the standards.7 6
In cases where state certification has been ob-
tained, but the EPA determines that the discharge
may violate applicable standards, the EPA could
recommend that the Army Corps of Engineers
deny the Permit. Rather than do this the EPA
indicates it will recommend issuance of a permit
which imposes specific duties on the discharger.
The applicant may be issued a permit which re-
quires him to adhere to a timetable for the con-
struction of abatement facilities necessary to in-
sure compliance with the water quality standards7
Serious default in meeting the conditions specified
would constitute grounds for revocation of the
permit and possible prosecution under the Refuse
Act by the Attorney General.7
Consequently, the first and most important
consideration required by the Executive Order,
compliance with applicable water quality stand-
ards, is determined largely by reference to state
established standards and state certification that
these standards will not be violated. The EPA's
position seems to be that it will accept state find-
ings of water quality considerations unless it finds
a gross deviation. In such cases, EPA will fre-
quently issue a conditional or restrictive permit.
The second requirement of Executive Order
11,574 directs that the Secretary of the Army
consult with the Secretary of the Interior, the
Secretary of Commerce, and the Administrator
of the EPA regarding the effect on fish and wild-
76 Id § I C 3; Exec. Order No. 11,574, § 2(a) (2) (A), 3
C.F.R. 188, (1970). Regardless of state ceitification,
EPA can unilaterally recommend denial of a permit if
it finds the discharge violates water quality standards
or if granting a permit would be inconsistent with previ-
ous EPA decisions concerning water quality considera-
tions or where a discharge includes oil, hazardous, or
toxic substances, or where fish and wildlife are not ade-
quately protected, or applicable state standards contain
loopholes so weak as to be inconsistent with the purpose
of the FWPCA. 1971 EPA Policy Statement, § I C 4;
Exec. Order No. 11,574, § 2(a) (2) (A), 3 C.F.R. 188(1970).
7 1971 EPA Policy Statement IV B. If an industry
is already following a state enforced implementation
plan, EPA will revise existing construction schedules
to provide applicants with the "shortest reasonable
time" to meet water quality standards. Id. IV A, B.
EPA created or revised plans would establish manda-
tory interim and final construction dates. Id. IV, D, E.
Failure to meet final completion date or serious over-
run of an interim date will constitute grounds for denial
of a permit, until construction is completed. If the speci-
fied treatment subsequently proves insufficient to meet
FWPCA water quality standards, EPA reserves the
right to require higher degrees of treatment. Id. III,
B, C.
78 1971 EPA Policy Statement X, A.
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life of a proposed discharge.7 9 If, as a result of
this consultation, the Secretary finds that a pro-
posed discharge will unreasonably affect fish and
wildlife, he may deny a permit even though the
state has certified and the EPA has recommended
a permit be issued."8 However, this consideration
applies only to permits which propose to deepen,
divert, or physically alter the stream or body of
water.8' For discharges which do not physically
alter the water body, the Secretary has no discre-
tion to deny a permit on the grounds of adverse
effect to fish and wildlife.
The Executive Order further directs that the
Secretary perform such consultations as required
by the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA).8 ' NEPA requires that to the fullest
extent possible, the policies, regulations, and laws
of the United States shall be interpreted and ad-
ministered in accordance with the policies it sets
forth. Foremost of these policies is the coordina-
tion of all federal programs to obtain the widest
range of beneficial uses of the environment "with-
out degradation" in a manner so as to "enhance
the quality of renewable resources." 8' To insure
that these policies are properly considered, the
NEPA requires that all federal agencies submit
to the Council on Environmental Quality a de-
tailed statement on the environmental impact
of any proposed action, including possible alterna-
tive procedures."' Thus the Army Corps of En-
gineers is required to submit the environmental
impact statement to the Council before it can issue
any discharge permits. However, Army Corps of
Engineers regulations administering the permit
program do not require submission of NEPA
79 Exec. Order No. 11, 574 § 2 (a) (3), 3 C.F.R. 188
(1970). The consultation is also required by the Fish
and Wildlife Co-ordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666c
et seq. (1956). At the consultation, the Regional Co-
ordinator, or Field Representative of the Department of
Interior, or the Regional Director of the National
Marine Fisheries Service of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration of the Department of
Commerce, review the impact of the proposed discharge
on fish and wildlife. If these agencies find an unreason-
ably harmful impact, they may object to issuance of a
permit. In this case, the matter is forwarded to Wash-
ington for consultation between the Secretary of Army,
the Administrator of the EPA and the Secretary of the
Interior. Thereafter a permit can be issued only in
accordance with their authorization. Army Corps of
Engineers Regulations, 3 C.F.R. 209.131 (d) (6), (i) (7)
(1970).
10 Exec. Order No. 11,574, 3 C.F.R. 188 (1970).81 1d.
82 42 U.S.C. §§ 4521-47 (Supp. V, 1970).
83 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (Supp. V, 1970).
"42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (c) (Supp. V, 1970); 42 U.S.C.
§433 (b) (3), (6) (1970).
statements as part of a Refuse Act permit applica-
tion."5
Because of this failure to comply with NEPA
requirements, the Army Corps has beeft enjoined
from issuing permits pending alteration of its
regulations to require submission of the environ-
mental impact statement.86 When amended, Army
Corps regulations should establish failure to com-
ply with the NEPA standard of non-degradation
as another ground for denying a permit. At present,
the regulations de-emphasize this consideration
in deciding whether to issue a permit.
Finally, the Secretary of the Army must con-
sider "factors, other than water quality" which
are prescribed by the Refuse Act." Army Corps
of Engineers regulations limit this consideration
to analysis of the impact a discharge may have
on anchorage or navigation 8' Any discharge,
which in the opinion of the Secretary will impair
navigation or anchorage, can be denied a permit
regardless of compliance with water quality stand-
ards and other considerations. Thus the Secretary
of the Army has the authority to unilaterally
deny a permit only if the refuse discharged will
block or otherwise impair the navigability of the
waterway.89 Since most industrial effluents do
85 333 C.F.R. § 209.131 (1) (2) (1971).
86 In Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971),
the court ruled that Army Corps of Engineers Regu-
lation 333 C.F.R. § 209 (1) (2) (1971), exempting
the Corps from considering the environmental impact
of proposed discharges under the Refuse Act permit
program, was an invalid disregard for NEPA stand-
ards. Abdication to FWPCA water quality standards
in determining whether a permit will issue is not au-
thorized by NEPA and does not preclude performance
of NEPA duties. The Corps must go beyond the water
quality standards of the FWPCA and consider whether
issuance of a permit will satisfy the NEPA non-degrada-
tion standard.' The court enjoined the Army Corps
from issuing any discharge permits until its regulations
are revised and an environmental impact statement is
filed for each permit. In accordance with the ruling, the
Army Corps of Engineers declared a moratorium on
issuance of permits pending changes in the regulations.
2 BNA ENVIRON. REP. 1088, CURRENT DEvs. (1972).
Previously a federal district court in the northern dis-
trict of Illinois had upheld the legality of the permit
program finding no arbitrary or capricious delegation,
to the EPA, of the authority granted to the Secretary
of the Army by 33 U.S.C. 407. Until permits were
issued, the court refused to substitute its judgment for
that of an administrative arm of the government in
determining what standards an application must meet.
Businessmen for the Public Interest v. Resor, 3 BNA
EN vIRoN. REP. 1216 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
87 § 2 (a) (2) (B) 3 C.F.R. 188 (1970).
88333 C.F.R. 209.131(d) (5) (1971).
89 At any stage of the permit procedure, the Army
Corps of Engineers can, without consultation, deny a
permit application on these grounds. 333 C.F.R. 209.131
(d) (5) (1971).
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not physically impair the waterway, the Secretary
has little power to deny a permit on the grounds
that the discharge will pollute the water.
In short, the decision to grant a Refuse Act
permit is made in three stages. First, the appro-
priate state agency considers the proposed dis-
charge and existing abatement facilities to deter-
mine if the applicant is in compliance with state
water quality standards. If the state agency certi-
fies the application, the EPA then considers it in
light of the state agency comments and the ap-
plicable state water quality standards. In the
event that the EPA believes the discharge will
violate state water quality standards, it may deny
the application or condition the permit on further
improvements. Once the EPA has decided that
water quality considerations are sufficiently met,
it recommends that the Secretary of the Army
grant a permit. At this point, the Secretary of
the Army can deny a permit only if he finds the
discharge will threaten fish and wildlife or will im-
pair navigation or anchorage. The most heavily
weighted factor is compliance with water quality
standards. This determination is made at the state
level subject to review by the EPA. The Army
Corps of Engineers and the general public pro-
vide only advisory assistance. 90
Since all discharges to navigable waters are
unlawful until authorized by an Army Corps of
Engineers permit, an industry which does not
90 Army Corps of Engineers Regulations, 333 C.F.R.
209.131 d seq. (1971), require that public notice of pro-
posed discharges be made when the completed applica-
tion is furnished to representatives of EPA and other
federal agencies. Id. (i) (4). This notice must describe
the proposed discharge and provide interested parties
any information they may need to evaluate its likely
impact. Members of the public then have 30 days to
express their views on the application. Id. at (j) (1)
(iv) and (1) (v). All information submitted on permit
applications is open to public inspection at the District
Engineer Office unless the applicant can demonstrate
that the information contains a trade secret. Id. (i) (5).
Comments received by the Corps of Engineers will be
used in deciding whether a permit will issue, after the
applicant has had any opportunity to rebut the objec-
tions. Id. (j) (2), Ci) (4).
Depending on the degree of interest expressed by the
public in response to public notice, the District Engineer
may in his discretion call a public hearing on the
application. Id. (k) (1). In cases where a proposed
discharge is challenged on the grounds that it fails to
meet water quality standards, the Army Corps of
Engineers District Engineer and EPA Regional Repre-
sentative shall be present at the hearing. Id. (k) (2).
The heating allows an "open and full discussion" by any
interested parties on all issues involved in issuing a
permit to the applicant. Id. (k) (4). The purpose of the
hearing is largely informative and there is no indication
that the Army Corps of Engineers or the EPA must be
bound by its conclusions.
apply for a permit or which fails to receive a per-
mit, is liable for criminal prosecution under the
Refuse Act." Should an industry secure a permit
and proceed to violate any condition of that per-
mit, the Attorney General may move to impose
any of the penalties of the Refuse Act. For in-
stance, an industry may be granted a permit which
specifies that the company must construct certain
abatement facilities according to a designated
construction plan which includes specified interim
completion dates." In addition, the permit may
provide that the industry's discharge must at no
time exceed the limits set by the state water quality
standards. If the company substantially overruns
a construction date, it becomes liable for criminal
prosecution under the Refuse Act for violating
the conditions of its permit, even though at no
time did its discharge exceed the limits prescribed
by the standards.93 If the company successfully
completes the required installations, but its dis-
charge violates the applicable standards, potential
Refuse Act liability-fines, imprisonment, and
injunctive relief-also attaches.
Tm EPFfEcTs oF ImposiNG CRh!NAX LABrlITY
UNDER THE REFUSE ACT PERMIT PROGRAM
In sum, the Refuse Act of 1899 imposes strict
criminal liability for discharges to navigable water-
ways. Discharges made in accordance with the
conditions of a Permit granted by the Refuse Act
Permit Program cannot result in criminal prose-
cution. Although the Executive Order directs that
other factors be considered, the primary factor
controlling the issuance of a permit is the appli-
cant's compliance with state created water quality
standards. 4 A discharger in compliance with ap-
plicable water quality standards, will likely be
granted a permit and be absolved of criminal li-
ability, whereas a discharger not in compliance
with the water quality standards will probably
be denied a permit and will be liable for the sanc-
91 Filing of an application for a Refuse Act Permit
does not preclude the institution of criminal proceedings
for discharges made before of during the processing of
the application. 333 C.F.R. 209.131 (d) (4) (1971). As
of December 7, 1971, nearly 6 months after the July I
deadline for filing permit applications, the Army Corps
of Engineers had received 19,715 applications for
34,873 outfalls. 232 of these applications were deter-
mined by the Corps to be complete and 17 permits had
been issued. It was estimated that these applications
alone would take two to four years to process. Druley
at S.
"1971 EPA Policy Statement, X.
9Id.
9 See text accompanying notes 63-89 supra.
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tions of the Refuse Act. Thus the Refuse Act Per-
mit Program imposes the criminal penalties of the
Refuse Act by reference to the FWPCA-state
created water quality standards.
The effect of issuing Refuse Act permits based
on compliance with existing water quality stand-
ards is to impose the criminal liability of the Refuse
Act without reference to the actual harm done
to the waterway by a particular discharge. Water
quality standards measure the concentration of
a particular pollutant in the water. They do not
measure or limit the quantity of effluent a particu-
lar industry is discharging into the water. Accord-
ing to the water quality standard approach, any
discharge with a concentration greater than the
specified level constitutes a violation.9 5 For in-
stance, Illinois and Indiana prohibit the discharge
into intrastate waters of any effluent with a cya-
nide concentration of greater than 0.025 milli-
grams per liter.96 Discharge of concentrations
above this level constitutes grounds for denial of
a Refuse Act Permit and subsequent criminal
liability under the Refuse ActY7 The concentra-
tion of a particular effluent, however, does not
reveal the quantity of pollutants discharged daily.
It is this measurement, the quantity of pollutants
added, rather than their concentration, that de-
termines the impact the effluent will have on water
quality.99
In determining the quantity of waste discharged,
the volume of the discharge or the flow is a crucial
factor.99 The greater the volume of effluent dis-
charged at a given concentration, the greater
the amount of pollutants put forth. Large flow
volumes with low pollutant concentrations means
a large poundage of effluent is entering the water.
Small flows with high concentration of individual
pollutants means low effluent poundage is being
discharged.1 9 The conversion of discharges meas-
ured in milligrams per liter to pounds per day
takes into account the volume of flow and provides
91 See note 54 supra.
9111. San. Water Board Reg. SW'B-14 (1971); IND.
Aim. RUsS AND REG. 68-523 (1) (1968).
9 See note 54 infra.
98 For pollutants like solids, local conditions of the
receiving water, such as velocity in the stream, particle
size, settling rate, and concentration of the discharge,
determine how much of the substance the river or
stream can safely tolerate. Kumey, The Industrial
Pollution Problem, in INDUSRAL PorLXTiON CONTROL
HANDBOOK 1-3, 1-17 (Lund ed. 1971).
19 Id. For the formula most frequently used in deter-
mining contaminant loading, see Paulson, Water Pollu-
lion Control Programs and Systems, id. 6-1, 6-10.
100 See note 98 supra.
a realistic measurement of how much polluting
material enters the waterway.
To illustrate this point, assume two industries
are located next to each other on the Grand Calu-
met River in Indiana. Company A is a large steel
mill discharging ninety three million gallons of
effluent daily from seven outfalls. 11 The concen-
tration of a pollutant in effluent from plant A is
9 mg/l. Plant B is a small manufacturing firm.
Its industrial effluent is completely recycled. Only
waste from its sanitary system is discharged to
the river. Company B employs 3 men and dis-
charges 3,000 gallons per day. The concentration
of this pollutant is consistently 10 mg/l. Assume
also that the applicable Indiana standard provides
that permissible concentrations of this pollutant
must be less than 10 mg/l.102 Thus company B
is in violation of the water quality standard and
its Refuse Act permit should be denied, while
company A is in full compliance. Company B will
then be liable for prosecution under the Refuse
Act because it discharges without a permit.
When the concentration measurements are con-
verted into pounds per day, company B discharges
only one-fourth of one pound of the pollutant each
day.13 Company A on the other hand can legally
discharge 6,975 pounds of the same effluent. Clearly
company A poses a greater threat to the waterway.
Yet it is company B that will be denied the permit,
and will be subject to criminal fines and imprison-
ment. Thus the water quality standard approach
101 Although a hypothetical value, 93 million gallons
per day is not an unrealistic discharge for a steel mill
since the production of one ton of steel generally
requires between 20,000 and 40,000 gallons of water.
For discussion of various water uses in the steel in-
dustry, see Kermer, Pollution Control in the Steel In-
dustry, INDUSTRIAL POLLUIION CONTROL HANDBOOK
10-3 (Lund ed. 1971).
'02 IND. ADms. RUTxs AND REG. 68-523 (8) SPC-8.
Water quality criteria for the Grand Calumet River
sets 10 mg/l as the limit for BOD, a measure of organic
waste present in industrial effluent.
101 The precise calculations for the conversion are:
Company A's pollutant concentration =
9 mg/I X 93,000,000 (gallons per day total effluent)
120,000 (constant)
A's waste load in pounds per day = 6,975
Company B's pollutant concentration =
10 mg/I X 3,000 (gallons per day total effluent)
120,000 (constant)
B's waste load in pounds per day = 0.25
See note 99 supra.
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of the FWPCA, in addition to having questionable
practical utility as a means of regulating water
pollution,"' diverts the imposition of criminal
liability under the Refuse Act from its intended
purpose of protecting the nation's waterways from
further degradation.
ONE ALTERNATIVE TO PRESENT WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL LEGISLATION
On November 2, 1971, the Senate unanimously
passed an amendment to the Federal Water Pollu-.
tion Control Act which might provide a legislative
solution to the present series of programs.0 5 The
Senate enactment establishes a policy designed
to eliminate the discharge of all pollutants into
navigable waters by 1985, with several interim
target dates.10 6 The proposal repeals the existing
04 There is evidence that many water quality stand-
ards adopted by the states and accepted by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency are deficient. In almost every
instance, the standards were formulated without
sufficient scientific -knowledge of a safe level of pol-
lutants. This lack of knowledge is especially true in the
case of metals and other toxic substances. See Psoxsr-
DENT'S CoUNcIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALiTY, Toxic
SuBSTANcES iv (1971); Zuzik, Research Programs for
Air and Water Pollution Control, INDusTRIAL POLLU-
TION CONTROL HAnBOOK 9-1, 9-16 (Lund ed. 1971);
Louria, The Human Toxicity of Certain Trace Elements,
76 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDIcINE 307 (1972).
Furthermore, because no baseline of existing water
quality had been defined when the standards were
formulated, many standards set discharge limits above
the pollutant concentrations presently in the water,
thus allowing legalized deterioration of bodies of water
such as the Great Lakes. Francis Mayo, Regional
Administrator of the EPA, statement to the Illinois
Pollution Control Board, August 19, 1970. This result
directly contradicts the guidelines established by the
Department of the Interior, to which all state standards
must be submitted for approval, which expressly stated
that in no case would standards providing for less than
existing water quality be acceptable. U.S. Department
of the Interior, Guidelines for Establishing Water
Quality Standards for Interstate Waters 4-5 (1966).
105 S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 et seq. (1971);
CONG. REc.: S. REs. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117.
106 S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (9) (1971). By
January 1, 1976, all point sources of pollution, other
than public treatment facilities, must be equipped with
the "best practicable control technology available" as
defined by the EPA Administrator. Not later than
January 1, 1981, non-public treatment sources must
completely eliminate all discharges unless the cost
would be prohibitive. Id. § 302 (b) (2) (A). Public
treatment facilities must meet the best technology
standard by 1981 and eliminate discharges by 1985. Id.
§ 301 (b) (2) (B). Newly created sources of pollution
would be required to achieve the greatest degree of
effluent reduction possible with latest technology. Id.
§ 306 (a) (1). The Administrator of the EPA would be
required to establish both national performance stand-
ards for 28 basic industries and effluent standards for
toxic substances within six months of the bill's enact-
ment Id. § 306 (b) (1) (A); Id. § 307 (a) (2).
FWPCA enforcement procedure with its 180 day
delay and allows the EPA to issue an abatement
order or seek injunctive relief 30 days after the
violation is reported.10 7 The state-created water
quality standards are eliminated. Rather, dis-
chargers must install abatement facilities that
meet a "best available technology"'' standard
and must totally eliminate all effluent discharges
by the 1985 deadline."9 Under the proposal, the
Refuse Act Permit Program would be transferred
from the Army Corps of Engineers to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency.n1 0 Refuse Act permits
would be issued only if the discharger has installed
the best available abatement facilities and is pro-
gressing adequately toward the cessation of all
discharges."' Penalties for willfully or negligently
violating an abatement order or violating a Refuse
Act permit condition include a fine of not more
than $25,000 and not less than $2,500 per day and
up to one year in jaij."'
This proposal would allow the Federal Govern-
ment to proceed with only minimum delay against
a violator to secure penalties which while not la-
beled as criminal sanctions, provide more mean-
ingful deterrence than the maximum fines per-
mitted under the Refuse Act.
CONCLUSION
Experience with the enforcement of other ec-
onomic regulations suggests that the relatively
minor criminal penalties imposed by the Refuse
Act provide little deterrence against an activity
10 7 When EPA finds a violation of the standards
discussed above, it must notify the violator and the
appropriate state agency. If the state takes no action
in 30 days, EPA can assume enforcement and issue an
abatement order requiring immediate compliance or in
the alternative bring a civil suit against the violator.
EPA can obtain temporary and permanent injunctive
relief for violation of an abatement order. Id. § 309 (a)
(1), (b).
108 According to William Ruckelshaus, Administrator
of the EPA, the "best technology standard" requires
closed-cycle recirculation and recovery of most in-
dustrial wastes which would otherwise be discharged as
effluent. The scientific know-how to construct and
install abatement facilities meeting this standard does
exist. The problem is one of economic feasibility. See
1971 Senate Hearings at 96.
1"' See note 106 supra.
'o S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 402 (1971).
"I Id. § 402 (a) (1). See also note 106 supra.
' S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 309 (c) (1). The
penalty for a second conviction would be a fine of up
to $50,000 per day and a two year jail sentence. Id. To
assist in the enforcement of the Act the proposal would
allow a citizen to bring a civil action against a violator
of an effluent standard or abatement order or against
the EPA Administrator for failure to perform a manda-
tory function. Id. § 505 (a) (1), (2)
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